Sunday, February 21, 2021

Answering R. Scott Smith on murder and rape

 This is my reply to an article by Dr. R. Scott Smith entitled:

There definitely is a place for appeals to utility in moral reasoning. E.g., when crafting public policy, we should consider the likely consequences of a proposed action, even when a deontological principle clearly applies.

So when Christian women consider the consequences of their decision to have an abortion (i.e., the child goes immediately to heaven and all chance they might end up in hell is infallibly preempted), then it is clear that the abortion has greater moral good, while allowing the child to grow up, gain freewill, and thus open up the possibility of being tortured in flames forever, is clearly immoral. Especially given that the aborted baby's entry to heaven is necessarily approved by God (how else would he let them in)?  

You couldn't be immoral to murder anybody, because according to Job 14:5, God has set an unchangeable number of days for a person to live.  If you murder somebody, you are necessarily carrying out god's will on what happens to them when their number of days are expired.  Gee, I never knew that obeying the will of God was immoral!

After all, people have to live with such decisions. Moreover, utilitarianism appeals to people, especially in secular societies, as apparently being morally neutral. There is no appeal to God or some other set of values to determine what is moral.

Fair enough. 

However, what gets to count as a “good” or “bad” consequence in the first place? Who gets to decide that?

In America, the "who" are the people who decide whether to vote on proposed legislation.  In certain parts of Africa, it is a witch-doctor.

According to whom is something (or someone) more valuable than another?

See above. 

Biases easily could enter the calculation here.

It would be impossible if they didn't, since morality is ultimately subjective.  There is no such thing as moral neutrality in that group of people who desire to cast a vote about proposed legislation.

To make such judgments seems to presuppose some outside standard, beyond utility.

No, making such judgments presupposes the basic morality of the individual that they have by reason of genetic predisposition and environmental conditioning.  Many people mistake such morals as objective, but they do, in fact, spring from those two sources, no need to posit any moral source that is "above humanity".

Another issue is that utilitarianism seems inadequate in terms of how it treats motives.

Indeed, because morality is relative, there is not going to be any system that will be satisfactory to everybody.  Some people simply prioritize the long-term and others the short-term, and history tells us nothing if it doesn't tell us that we are incapable of creating moral utopia.  There's enough commonality to explain creation of different moral groups (nations, states, towns, clubs, churches) but not enough commonality to justify efforts to unite the whole world in morality.  Exactly what we'd expect on naturalism.

Yet, surely they are morally important. If someone kills another, it makes a major difference if it was done intentionally or accidentally. We rightly recognize that difference in the law.

But only for people who care about the long-term stability of society, not for those of more independent persuasion.  That's a lot of people.  Most people do in fact go faster than the speed limit, cheat on their taxes, and many refrain from calling the police if they have seen a crime, judging the judicial system inadequate to meet their needs.

Relatedly, utilitarianism undermines acts of moral supererogation, ones that are heroic and praiseworthy, yet not required. Suppose someone is jogging but notices another person in danger of being attacked by a third person with a knife. While we should expect that jogger to at least call for help (call the police or cry out, to scare off the attacker), it would be above and beyond the call of duty for that jogger to fight off the attacker and save the would-be victim. Yet, on utilitarianism, that act would be obligatory if it would result overall in net good consequences.

Then have fun refuting utilitarian advocates who think their system covers all possible moral situations.  Count me out.

Perhaps most significantly, utilitarianism makes net utility the basis for what is moral.

That's why it cannot be the answer to all moral situations, as most people do not agree that whatever is best in the long term for the majority of people is best.  People will flout the law for their own personal moral reasons often without caring whether this would help or hurt the larger concerns. 

Consider again our core morals: murder and rape are wrong, and justice and love are good.

Murder is not always wrong, its a question of whether the law which criminalize certain types of killing might end up operating to create a greater injustice, which discussion is not pointless merely because morals are relative.  We live with each other hear on earth, we don't need to claim we speak for God in order to legitimately seek what we believe is moral justice.

If you think rape is always immoral, then you are saying God is morally wrong.  See the Good News Translation of Deuteronomy 21:14.  Christian translators would hardly render the Hebrew as "forced her to have intercourse with you" if they could have grammatically justified any less rape-sounding translation. 

If the good consequences of a murder outweigh the bad, then that act would be justified and even obligatory.

But whether the good consequences DO outweigh the bad, is a moral judgment call that not even Christians can agree on.

The same goes for rape, whether under act or rule utilitarianism.

No, you only establish this "core" value by arbitrarily preempting the opinion held by remorseless rapists.  That's not very objective or clinical, that's nothing more than "those people are yucky so their opinion doesn't count."  And there are plenty of women who have a "rape fetish", and there is counseling available for rape victims who orgasmed during the rape.  But the victim having an orgasm during the rape probably isn't something you hear about in the mass media.  But an atheist could pounce on that as a proof that either your god doesn't exist, or the god who exists is a barbarian.  But that's not difficult anyway:  girls become capable of bearing children when they reach 12 years of age.  The male's sex drive is strongest during their teen years.  Why?  Might it be that your god seriously thought that having a family and working the farm was far more important than literacy, college and capitalism?

But these results clearly are deeply mistaken, to say the least. If this justification held, it could be moral to rape another person,

You don't have an argument indicating that rape is objectively immoral.  You just blindly presuppose that is the case because you know most people will agree with it.  But popularity doesn't equal truth.  You have to ask WHY most people think rape is wrong.  That's easy, the way they were raised:  most of us were not raised to take advantage of other people., and we were raised to believe that we shouldn't be subjecting somebody else to misery unless only a greater evil would occur without it, so since the satisfaction of the rapists sexual drive is not viewed by most people as a high priority, while their being born and raised in a democratic nation tells them the girl doesn't deserve to be raped, most people naturally eschew rape.

or murder a racial minority person who is protesting peacefully for civil rights.

There is no doubt that such a statement as this will garner an awful lot of support for you because America as a whole is steaming over the white cops killing black men.  But again, you have nothing but popularity on your side.  Once again, you cannot prove the objective immorality of a racist cop killing a black man in a way contrary to the applicable state and federal laws.   

But, we deeply know such acts are wrong; otherwise, why would there be such uproars against these acts?

But WHY do we "deeply know" such acts are wrong?  Gee, is it sheer coincidence that our viewpoint on such things is in harmony with the way most of us were raised, and in harmony with the kind of mammalian genetic predisposition most of us are born with (i.e., don't do something which threatens the survival of the group)?

Furthermore, your implied belief that murder is objectively immoral is disproven from the bible, in which God takes personal responsibility for all murders (Deuteronomy 32:39, Job 14:5, see Deut. 28:15-63).  You don't have to be a hyper-Calvinist to argue as a Christian that god is responsible for evil and works it to his own good.  That logically requires that when some white cop guns down a black man, God was more responsible for why the atoms in the cops brain did what they did, than the cop himself.  Biblical statements about God's omnipresence contradict biblical statements supporting libertarian freewill.  There is no place God is absent from, and that includes brain synapses.  Unless you wish to argue that ancient Semitic peoples tended to include exaggeration in their religious texts?  Gee, that wouldn't create a serious problem for inerrancy, would it? A Bible whose statements about God often exaggerate him?  How about a Court of law declaring the Affidavit of some witness "inerrant" despite its containing exaggerations?

Likewise, justice would be reduced to whatever is the result of the calculation. A rape or murder would be just in a society that is predominately one race if that act would maximize the overall benefits for the majority. Yet, if these acts can be just on this moral system, we have lost justice.

No, we'd have lost our current sense of justice.  Once again, your arguments blindly and wrongly presuppose that you DO have unchallengable "core" moral elements.  You don't.  You just have a lot of mammals in the world whose genetic predispositions are similar enough to explain their grouping together, but not similar enough to create moral utopia...exactly what we'd expect in a godless mammalian world where trying to stay alive and thrive is the ultimate purpose.

Indeed, murder’s and rape’s wrongness, and justice’s and love’s goodness, seem to be intrinsically so.

And there you go again appealing to the emotions of the reader, but surely an apologist can do better to prove objective morality, than by remarking that certain morals "seem" intrinsic.

But "intrinsic" doesn't have to imply transcendance.  Morals become lodged in our minds as we are raised by our caregivers.  I'm not seeing why that naturalistic explanation is leaving anything unexplained. 


Answering R. Scott Smith on subjective morality

 This is my reply to an article by R. Scott Smith entitled

Making Sense of Morality: An Introduction to Naturalism 

January 25, 2021/ R. Scott Smith

What should we make of these noncognitivist views? First, by reducing away any cognitive content from moral sentences, they end up being merely descriptive. But, morality deeply seems to be about what is normative, or prescriptive.

"Seems"?  Surely you have something to ground objective morality more than this?  

It also "seems" that Leviticus 21:9 is mere barbarism from an Iron Age culture.  Is "seems" sufficient for argument, yes or no? 

If people protest against a miscarriage of justice (e.g., an unarmed African-American man who was walking down a street, but was murdered by white men), they are not merely emoting. Instead, they deeply believe there was an injustice done, which is why they are upset.

But "deeply believe" doesn't an objective moral make.  The Nazi's "deeply believed" that the Jews deserved to be exterminated.  Christian Reconstructionists "deeply believe" that replacing all American law with the moral commands of the Pentateuch would be morally good.  But surely Christian moral scholars could not possibly agree on whether it was good.   Thus leaving skeptics no reason to think that God's absolute viewpoint is in there somewhere.

Second, moral judgments are not identical with feelings or commands, for the former can occur without the latter.

The show me a moral judgment that isn't identical with a feeling or a command.  Good luck.

We do not need to have any feelings when we state, “Murder is wrong.”

False, feelings reduce to 'thoughts', so you are saying we don't need to have thoughts when we state "murrder is wrong".

But even assuming your logic is correct, then we also don't need to have any feelings when we say "some moral situations would justify disobeying the law and committing vigilante justice."

But again, the wrongness of murder is inherently tied to the moral goodness of the law that is making such killing illegal.  If state law criminalized use of deadly force in self-defense, the fact that it thus became "murder" would not convince most Christians to conform, most would still use lethal force if they thought doing so was necessary to save them from an immediate threat of death or great bodily harm.

So then you can know that murder is sometimes morally good if you can spot moral flaws in the law which criminalizes certain types of killing.  What constitutes a moral 'flaw' is, of course, relative.  But that hardly means it is pointless.  Your liking the taste of some food that others hate is equally subjective, yet that doesn't require that it is flawed.

That's a big problem with you moral objectivists: you always act like the subjectivity of a moral opinion means that opinion is somehow defective.  Not at all. One parent in the neighborhood has her own dogmatic belief that the kids shouldn't be playing outside after 7 p.m., the parent down the street has the same attitude but her limit is 8 p.m.  These moral stances are subjective, but that hardly means that either of them are "flawed".

So stop telling yourself that "subjective" equals "flaw/defective".  It doesn't.  Even if it would make things difficult for inerrantists.

And, we can have feelings without moral judgments.

Sure, but not when it comes to morality.  If the store owner feels like he should call the police about the teen who stole a soda, I'm not seeing how that could possibly be distinguished from his moral judgment that such theft be prosecuted. 

Third, there is no room for any moral education or training on these views, since there is no cognitive content to learn and therefore no real moral disagreement.

No, moral disagreements don't require that at least one party hold to a moral that is objectively real or transcendent.  see above example about parents disagreeing about the latest time in the day to allow their kids to play outside.  Each parent can profitably teach their subjective moral to their kids, even if there is no god who has an absolute time for kids to stop playing outside.

But, this result undermines any training in moral virtue, such as in why we should address examples of injustices in society.

No, there is nothing about subjective morality that "undermines" requiring kids to obey their parents' subjective morals.  The only question is where we draw the line, and this, again, is subjective.  You continually presume that if the moral in question is not objective, then it is either wrong or pointless to deal with it.  This is absurd.

It also wouldn't matter if you were correct.  I too hear about racism in America's police department, and guess what:  I don't "address" those "examples of injustice in society", in the serious way that you obviously intended the word "address".  I might mention some such examples here or there, but I don't "address" them seriously. My life has enough of its own issues without needing to "address" such issues.  What are you going to say now?  All atheists who don't participate in political protest rallies aren't living consistently with atheist morality?

It also does not do justice to the fact that many of us do disagree morally. This is plain to see when we look at the many social and moral issues we deliberate and debate.

Once again, the moral disagreement between two persons doesn't have to implicate objective morals before their disagreements on it can be profitable.  Such as the child who doesn't want to wear the particular shoes the parent wants them to wear.  I can't see any divine oversight about such a trifle, and yet even most Christians would say the parent should discuss this with the child, since maybe one of them will discover some truth (i.e., the shoes give the child blisters, or the child is lying about the blisters, etc).

My question to Christian philosopher R. Scott Smith

 At the Christian apologetics site  https://www.moralapologetics.com/wordpress/msm13

  R. Scott Smith's article is linked.  So I went to his contact page and sent him the following questions:

Hello, 

I am an atheist, and I was wondering what you think of the following argument:  When most people really think about it, they do not seriously believe that unreasonableness is an essential component of faulty argument.  For example, jurors are "wrong" to convict an innocent person, but if trial consisted of the right combination of clever prosecutor and incompetent defense attorney, you could hardly blame the jury for thinking it reasonable to view the suspect as guilty.

If then it be true that unreasonableness doesn't necessarily inhere in all faulty arguments/beliefs, aren't you admitting there is at least a possibility, even if not a probability, that one's denial of God might remain "reasonable" despite being "false"?

I ask because it is my experience that Christians are constantly equating a skeptical belief or skeptical denial with "unreasonableness", as if they thought "inaccurate" and "unreasonable" were necessarily synonymous, which not even a thesaurus will confirm.



---------------------

I now answer the relevant portion of his argument at 
moralapologetics.com/wordpress/msm13

Now, we will see when we explore ethical relativism that while there is a fact of moral diversity amongst people and cultures, nonetheless those differences may not be as wide or deep as we have been taught.

So I guess apologists are wrong when they get from the bible the notion that hundreds of thousands of Canaanites lived a morality that was diametrically opposed to the morality of the Hebrews.

Instead, we can identify common morals that may be applied differently (e.g., how people in one culture show respect for their elders, versus how people in another culture do so).

I'm not seeing the point, the fact that we are all mammals and desire to live together means were are going to discover that the best way to facilitate this is to agree on some common morality.  Frank Turek's statement that atheists cannot sufficiently or reasonably account for why most humans in history have eschewed rape, is absurd.  If you desire to live in groups, outlawing rape is one definite way to enhance group survival.  On the other hand, God's requirement to burn pre-adolescent girls to death (if she is having illicit sex in her father's house, she is likely not married and still living there, thus she is likely 12 years old or younger since marriage took place at early age back then) is so despised by Christians that we could use Turek's logic "we all know that rape is wrong" and say "we all know that burning teen and preteen prostitutes to death is wrong", and we'd have set a basis for beliving that God wanted us to believe that Leviticus 21:9 wasn't from Him.

Further, just because there is a descriptive fact of diversity, that alone does not give us ethical relativism, which is a normative thesis.

Correction, doesn't "necessarily" give us ethical relativism.  But I myself do not argue that my conclusions abuot such matters follow "necessarily", especially in the area of which morals are "right".  

Which means I don't need to argue necessity to win the debate, all I have to show is that my position on the matter is reasonable.  Reasonableness can exist even if the opinion in question doesn't follow "necessarily".  Just like we can be reasonable to call the police only to find out later that we misinterpreted the scene.

Granted, too, irreducibly moral properties would be rather “queer” given naturalism. But, perhaps there are independent reasons why we should question that assumption. In later essays, I will suggest a few such reasons.

I've been analyzing Christian moral apologetics for several years now.  Matthew Flannagan did little more than run away when I debated him at his blog and asked what moral yardstick he uses to decide whether some human act is morally good or bad.  I documented many such failures on his part.  Here's two:

https://turchisrong.blogspot.com/2017/11/matthew-flannagan-fails-to-show-child.html

 https://turchisrong.blogspot.com/2019/07/my-latest-challenge-to-matthew-flannagan.html

Moreover, it is true that we may speak in ways that do not necessarily commit us to the reality of things we are talking about.

That's right.  The atheist who views his own morality as "absolute" is a fucking fool.

Generally, mere word uses do not have power to cause things to come into existence (except, for instance, stories). A scientific example was talk of phlogiston to explain combustion. Later, however, scientists discovered it was not real; instead, oxygen was what was involved.

Further, error theory does not explain why we find morality to be such a ubiquitous aspect of life.

Maybe so, but other atheist theories DO explain it.  Morality is found everywhere in human life because we are mammals and hard wired to be societal, and thus to prioritize that which contributes to group survival above that which inhibits it.  Little wonder then why most people eschew rape, child molestation, murder and theft, and have only good things to say about getting a job, raising kids, going to college, disinfecting the bathroom, etc, etc. 

After all, why talk morally if there are no morals?

Straw man, morals obviously exist, the problem is that they appear to be nothing more than opinions.  Atheists have just as much justification to talk about adultery as they have to talk about politics.  Nothing about those conversations express or imply that we are speaking about things that originate in something transcendent to humanity.

While error theory explains why we can talk morally, given naturalism, it still does not give us an adequate explanation of what morals are.

Easy:  when you say "you shouldn't steal" and "you shouldn't use the tv remote", these ultimately reduce to thoughts.   

If they are just the way we use words, then we can change morals by changing how we talk. In that case, murder could become right, and justice could become bad. But surely that is false.

What do you mean "surely"?  So at the end of the day, your argument for objective transcendent morals is nothing more than the fallacy or argument from outrage?

Murder is not intrinsically wrong merely because it is the "unlawful" killing of another human being, because this begs the question of whether such prohibitive law is itself always a good thing.  If the state law criminalized use of deadly force in self-defense, then killing in self-defense would be "murder", but that would hardly justify pretending that the law making it so was completely beyond criticism.

Probably wouldn't take me long to find many normal typical every day mature adult fathers who would make effort to murder the babysitter for molesting their child, even if the molestation did not put the child's life in danger (i.e., inappropriate touching, a crime that wouldn't justify use of lethal force).  Again, most of us are shocked by the news that a dead body with a bullet hole in its head was found in some ditch outside of town...but most of us stop crying if the news continues and says it is the body of a convicted pedophile who was recently paroled.  Our inability to cry equally giant tears when we hear of the death of a pedophile as when he hear about the death of a pedophile commits us to the premise that while the state law against murder is generally good for society, we are not foolish enough to think that it is an absolutely exceptionless standard.

Once again, most of us don't like gang warefare.  But if we heard on the news that two rival gangs met in a parking lot outside town and killed each other in a gun battle, most of us would be happy that additional human scum are not longer a threat.  It was murder, but the moral goodness of the result is no less apparent than the moral goodness of eating nutritious food.  And like it or not, yes, most people do believe the ends justify the means, even if they are willing to take the personal risks that would materialize if they lived in total consistency to that viewpoint.

As far as relative morality committing itself to the premise that in some situations, it would be morally good for justice to become bad, this seems to be a bit convoluted.  But even so, it isn't hard to imagine scenarios where a person believes that the way the law operates results in "bad justice", but where that person decides to just conform to it anyway.  The innocent suspect might be looking at only 2 years on a plea deal, but risks 20 years if he goes to trial.  He views his guilty plea as resulting in "bad justice", and yet it was morally good to him because he was forced to choose this evil over the greater evil of losing trial and getting 20 years.  Can it possibly be good for justice to be bad?  Yes.  In the civilized world we live in, any justice system is eventually going to put an individual in the situation of being required to either choose a lesser evil or a greater evil, so that their choosing the lesser evil ends up proving to be the "good" choice.

My challenge to moralapologetics.com

 I recently found a website where Copan, Flannagan, Habermas and others defend moral arguments for god and answer skeptical objections thereto:   https://www.moralapologetics.com


This was my first posted challenge to them, see https://www.moralapologetics.com/wordpress/2021/2/17/why-the-horrendous-deeds-objection-is-still-a-bad-argument

Can a skeptic possibly be reasonable in harboring a false argument against Christianity? Or do you insist that the falsity of their argument automatically necessitates unreasonableness?






Friday, February 19, 2021

my recent posts to YouTube about Lydia McGrew

 Since I cannot be certain those threads won't be deleted, here's what I posted to the comment-sections of several YouTube videos about Lydia McGrew:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTAja4qvn3A

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DvlPWMiiQvY

-------------------------

When Lydia was asked why spiritually dead people should be expected to understand biblical matters when spiritually alive people cannot even agree on how to interpret most of it, she replied in a way that pretty much conclusively demonstrates that her commitment to Jesus is 100% naturalistic. She said

--------"Being spiritually alive has zilch to do with it." -------------
Apparently she has never read Romans 8:5-8, 1st Corinthians 2:14, 2 Corinthians 4:3-4, nor the scores of other NT verses that clearly teach that being spiritually dead either makes it exceptionally difficult, or outright impossible, for the unbeliever to understand spiritual/biblical matters. What an irony that the answer she gave would be contested by a large majority of conservative bible believing Trinitarian Christian scholars!
see http://whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2017/10/on_some_examples_in_plutarch.html
-
See my further answers to her:
https://turchisrong.blogspot.com/2017/11/lydia-mcgrews-suspicious-excuses-for.html
https://turchisrong.blogspot.com/2019/02/dr-lydia-mcgrews-errors-in-defending.html
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I also show that Lydia's ceaseless "he said/she said" gossipy yappy form of "apologetics" constitutes the very "word-wrangling" that Paul explicitly prohibited in 2nd Timothy 2:14, see
https://turchisrong.blogspot.com/2018/06/open-letter-to-lydia-mcgrew-your-online.html
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What I should have added were the many biblical condemnations of being wordy and talkative:
https://www.openbible.info/topics/talking_too_much
Gee, Lydia couldn't possibly be guilty of the sin of too many words, could she?
-
I also directly and politely challenged Lydia to debate the resurrection of Jesus, as I have plenty of arguments that are unique and do not repeat the fanfare of HumeShe declined, saying
------------"Nobody who speaks in defense of the gospel, not even an apologist, is setting himself up to spend indefinite amounts of time answering anybody with a keyboard who comes along, thumps his chest, and says, "I hereby challenge you." Go away."-----------
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So I wonder: if a skeptic does little more at his blog beyond critiquing Lydia's apologetics, but then declines her debate challenge by saying "Nobody who speaks in opposition to the gospel, not even a counter-apologist, is setting himself up to spend indefinite amounts of time answering anybody with a keyboard who comes along, thumps his chest, and says, "I hereby challenge you." Go away."
-
(I responded to her entire bullshit excuse for refusal to debate me, here: https://turchisrong.blogspot.com/2017/11/lydia-mcgrews-suspicious-excuses-for.html)
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Would Lydia suspect or not suspect a professional counter-apologist of being afraid of losing the debate, should he decline a debate challenge using the same pretexts that Lydia did? Or does she think it is written in the stars that only gossipy Christian apologists are allowed to use obviously dishonest excuses to duck challenges?
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Lest anybody think it is only stupid skeptics who think Lydia is unnecessarily hostile in her comments, then maybe you think conservative Trinitarian inerrantist evangelical Ph.d experts on Jesus' resurrection are "stupid skeptics". Lydia's unnecessarily negative tone is also why Licona didn't wish to debate her:
https://www.thinkingchristian.net/posts/2018/04/mike-licona-answers-regarding-lydia-mcgrew/

Maybe its just my "stupidity", but if anybody had an internet-world of constantly "refuting" their opponents, but then was also known to consistently duck challenges from capable opponents, it would be reasonable to infer that in at least some of those debate rejections, she is lying: her real reason for refusal to debate is the same reason a criminal Defendant would rather not take the witness stand: his bullshit story wouldn't last long under cross-examination.

Let's just say that because Lydia is so loud-mouthed about the errors of Habermas' "minimal facts" approach and Licona's refusal to use the canonical gospel resurrection narratives, this is going to justify skeptics to say that because even spiritually alive people cannot figure out what type of apologetics god wants the church to use, it is going to be reasonable for the skeptic to classify the subject matter as too convoluted to risk becoming involved with and then likely adding to their sins another sin of thinking Lydia is wrong and somebody else is right.

Thursday, February 11, 2021

Cold Case Christianity - yes, Mr. Wallace: Denominational disagreements DO falsify Christianity

 This is my reply to an article by J. Warner Wallace entitled


Cold Case Christianity: Do Denominational Disagreements Falsify Christianity?

Posted: 11 Feb 2021 08:00 AM PST

A common objection to Christianity focuses on the denominational differences existing between the numerous Christian sects we see across the globe. If there is one Christian God, why are there so many different denominations of Christians?

The bible clearly requires Christians to be in doctrinal agreement (1st Cor. 1:10, Phil. 2:2), and Paul made clear how sinful it was to disagree with his version of the gospel (Galatians 1:6-9), so the fact that so many Christian denominations today disagree on "Lordship Salvation" and the doctrines of grace (i.e., Calvinism v. Arminianism), means skeptics are reasonable to first demand that God give clear answers on these questions before they do what the fundies demand, and become completely devoted to never questioning but always agreeing with whatever the NT "teaches".

You can hardly foist an intellectual obligation upon a skeptic to resolve in 2 weeks of research the doctrinal differences that the Christian scholars of these respective denominations have been disagreeing on for decades.  And yet if you tell the skeptic that it is good for him to research such things, that is also committing yourself to the premise that the sketpic can safely delay the day of his repentance for perhaps years.  Can he? 

Don't you believe that the atheist is always one heart-beat away from hell?  If so, then why do you think the skeptic can "safely" delay the day of their repentance?  

Finally, there is no law of hermeneutics, historiography or common sense that says the skeptic is required to justify this basis for skepticism in an absolute way.

Does the existence of numerous (and contradictory) versions of Christianity prove Christianity is false?

No, their existence justifies the skeptic to put off the possibility of repenting and "getting save" until he or she has done enough research to satisfy themselves that a) NT authors give us correct theology, and b) that church over there in the modern world is the "right" one.  Since smart Christian scholars battle each other in these denominations, the time necessary to figure out which view of the NT is "right" is going to be a lifetime, since that's how long smart Christian scholars disagree about essential doctrines like Lordship salvation and the doctrine of grace.  So that the argument from extensive research time ends up justifying the skeptic who decides that the NT doesn't make a prima facie case in the first place, and therefore, the only people that should bother with it are those who personally find it fun to argue theology. 

If Christians can’t even agree on what they believe, why should anyone else believe Christianity is true?

Good point, but remember, the skeptic is completely outside Christianity.  He will not agree with you that "true" Christianity agrees about the Trinity and salvation by Grace, etc.  He will insist that the Jehovah's Witnesses and other "cults" disagree with mainline protestantism, and their views on NT theology deserve research no less than does the Trinitarian neo-evangelical view.

Truth, by its very nature, is often elusive and difficult to ascertain.

And according to Ezra 1:1, God can cause a person to believe whatever he wants them to believe with a mere wave of his magic wand. 

The more hidden or complex the truth claim, the more difficult it is to determine, given our limited capacity as humans.

And your god's apparently unwillingness to make the required theology clear justifies the skeptic to say that they will start getting serious with God when god starts getting serious with them.  Until then, God is free to pretend that his fortune cookie answers in the bible are sufficient to keep sinners accountable.  He is also free to believe that Japan is located in Germany. 

To make matters worse, our innate, fallen qualities of pride and rebellion cause us to disagree and separate from one another along the way.

Which only proves you are now preaching the choir.  Skeptics do not agree that it is humanity's sinful fallen limited nature that is to be blamed for their spiritual disagreements.  We rather say those disagreements arise because the bible is fatally ambiguous on those points.  otherwise you'd have to say that if you seriously believe your denomination is the "right religion", then you are a better person than Christians in other denominations, since you were able to figure it out, or you did something more than they did to attract god's enlightening grace.  But if you cannot charge Christians who disagree with your theology with being more sinful or stupid than you, then you are admitting that they can be just as saved and smart as you, and yet still misunderstand the bible.  Why you think this mess of conflicting views foists the least bit of intellectual obligation on any skeptic to jump in the fray, is anyone's guess.

Christians are not alone in their struggle to understand the truth. We aren’t the only people who struggle with disagreement and separation:

But skeptics who disagree with each other are in a better position than you:  they aren't claiming that it is the same god that is guiding all of them.  

So, Wallace, do you say God is guiding any denomination that you happen to disagree with?  

Human Disagreement is Common to Every Field of Study

The differences is that the non-Christians who disagree with each other aren't claiming they are being guided by any god.  The only way you can recover from that rebuttal is to allege, like a good Calvinist, that maybe god wants Christians to disagree on theology because he has a higher mysterious purpose.  But then such appeal to mystery provides skeptics even further reason to disregard Christanity.

So, you can't really say whether God will direct me to the right religion no matter how sincere I am in asking him to?  Then why the fuck would I bother with such a god? 

Very few fields of study are characterized by uniform agreement. As an example, secular scientists who study the origin of the universe have divided into a number of theoretical camps, including “Big Bang” Cosmologists, “Steady State” Cosmologists, “Conformal Cyclic” Cosmologists, “Ekpyrotic” Cosmologists, “Multiverse” Cosmologists, “Pre-Big Bang Theory” Cosmologists, “Quantum Theory” Cosmologists and many more. These careful thinkers are examining the same set of facts, yet have separated in disagreement with one another, even though they agree on many essential issues.

Same answer.

Human Disagreement is Common to Every Worldview

More expansive worldviews are not immune to this kind of disagreement. For example, a quick search on the Internet reveals those who deny the existence of God have categorized themselves in a number of varying ways, including “Implicit” Atheists, “Explicit” Atheists, “Weak” Atheists, “Strong” Atheists, “Iconoclastic” Atheists, “Pragmatic” Atheists, “Mono” Atheists, “Myopic” Atheists, “Realistic” Atheists, “Scientific” Atheists, “Logical” Atheists and many more. Even people who have examined the same set of facts and hold an atheistic worldview have distinguished themselves as distinct from one another, even though they agree on many essential issues.

Once again, we don't claim to be guided by a god, so our disagreements with each other are not problematic.  YOU claim that mainline Protestant Christian denominations are guided by God, otherwise you'd have to publicly specify which such churches you think aren't guided by God, and you wouldn't dare pretend to be that smart.

Human Disagreement Does Not Negate the Existence of Truth

But human disagreement can justify an outsider's skepticism that the truth can be successfully found, thus justifying the skeptic to avoid devoting serious effort to discovering that "truth". 

While people may disagree about a specific truth claim, this disagreement does not mean a particular truth does not exist or cannot be known.

But Christian disagreement on biblical doctrine has persisted for 2,000 years, strongly implying that either Christians are a special breed of stupid, or else the biblical wording is genuinely fatally ambiguous, the latter of which would justify anybody to avoid wasting their time trying to figure out your god's fortune cookie bullshit. 

In every jury trial, two sides oppose one another; one side believes the defendant is guilty, the other side believes the defendant is innocent. There is a truth related to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, in spite of the disagreement. Even though both sides are examining the same set of facts, they’ve come to two separate conclusions. One of them is right and one of them is wrong. Truth is not negated by their disagreement.

But the fact that so many juries become deadlocked suggests that some pursuits of "truth" are exercises in futility.


Worse, apologists conveniently forget that they are dealing with allegeldy "spiritual" truth, so that when they encourage the skeptic to study biblical truth, they are not doing the equal of asking the skeptic to study geographical truth.  They are asking the skeptic to get involved in what the apologist views as a realm that is full of spiritual danger.  Apologists are fucking idiots to do what they usually do, and encourage skeptics to enter this realm, since by their own opinion, a person's only protection from spiritual deception is their salvation in Christ.  Smart skeptics would likely conclude the demonstrable benefits of "getting saved" are outweighed by the alleged "dangers".

Christians of every denomination have examined the same set of facts from the Biblical text and the 1st Century evidence. While we may disagree about a number of peripheral matters, we agree on the essential doctrines of the Christian Worldview.

No, you disagree about the nature of Christ's resurrection, his deity, the trinity, how to get saved, whether "getting saved" is even understood correctly by the fundies, etc. 

You will trifle that your disagreements with Jehovah's Witnesses and other legalists or "heretics" don't count beacuse those guys are just "cultists", but it is the skeptic who has to decide whether these groups count in the final analysis.  They do.  What are you going to do, demand that a spiritually dead skeptic "recognize" that Christians who deny Christ's deity and bodily resurrection aren't "true" Christians?  LOL.  Why don't you also teach calculus to a dog? 

As a result, we can accurately call each other “brothers and sisters in the faith.”

There is nothing in the bible supporting the modern Christian premise that God cares more about "essential" theology.  If God inspired the entire bible, then it would appear that the Christians are only inventing the "essential/non-essential theology" distinction because that is the best way they can think of to deal with the doctrinal differences without admitting defeat.  But just read Revelation, it certainly seems like the allegedly divinely inspired author expected his readers to know what he was talking about...thus God expected the readers to know what he was talking about...thus when two Christians disagree on their interpretation of Revelation, it MUST be that one of them is not correctly hearing the voice of the Holy Spirit.

Unless you charge that Christian with lack of salvation, lack of sincerity or having unconfessed sins (accusations you aren't likely to hurl), then you must live with the logical possibility that God wants that other Christian to misunderstand Revelation.  Hopefully you don't need to be told why skeptics would tell any god who toys with people that way to go fuck himself. 

These disagreements are a reflection of the fallen nature of humans.

No, they are the result of the biblical wording being genuinely fatally ambiguous. 

All of us, regardless of worldview or area of study, are influenced by our pride and rebellion; we often separate from one another over minor issues having no bearing on the overall truth of a matter. Christians are no more immune to this tendency than those who deny the existence of God altogether.

But the bible seems to clearly insist that Christians be immune to that tendency.  Philip. 2:2, etc, supra.

While we may disagree about a number of peripheral matters, we agree on the essential doctrines. As a result, we can accurately call each other brothers and sisters in the faith.

Then apparently you didn't write this in an effort to refute skeptics, you were only trying to help Christians feel better about transcending their denominational differences.  Which means you failed to support your basic thesis that denominational disagreements don't falsify Christianity.

When a skeptic refuses to enter that allegedly dangerous realm of the spiritual unless god makes the truth equally as clear to her as God made it clear to apostle Paul, as they asking too much of the bible god, yes or no?  What use is the bible if you are going to make endless excuses about why God no longer wishes to reveal truth the dramatic way he allegedly did in the bible?  Doesn't that teach the skeptic that becoming a Christian requires them to sharpen their skills are picking and choosing?

Monday, February 8, 2021

Jason Engwer either doesn't know about, or doesn't care about, authenticating evidence: The Enfield poltergeist farce, again

 I cannot believe what a dipshit Jason Engwer is.   I've written about his Enflield Poltergeist crap before.  See here and here.

He is expecting his readers to draw confident conclusions about the paranormal based on audio recordings of the "Enfield Poltergeist" that somebody else uploaded to YouTube.  See here.

Gee, Jason, have you never heard of authentication, and what is implied when you cannot or will not authenticate the evidence you supposedly want skeptics to deal with?

Or maybe you think authentication was invented only by skeptics to make sure they could get rid of most of the evidence for the spiritual world?

An examination of the people who uploaded that audio also doesn't inspire confidence:

https://www.youtube.com/c/TheParanormalDetectives/about

In other words, Engwer wants his Christian readers to think that these promises of authenticity are dependable, when in fact the "paranormal detectives" won't claim to have been the person who made the recording.  

That would be like me telling you that the moon rocks in my possession are not fakes.  Given that i wasn't the one who originally obtained them, how the fuck could I possibly expect you to believe that claim of authenticity was reliable?

Engwer is willing to talk all day and night about what he knows from the tapes, but he doesn't upload them, nor provide any authenticity declaration.  See here.

Engwer created a post entitled "The Enfield Poltergeist Tapes Made More Accessible",  but, as usual, he doesn't direct us to downloads of those tapes. instead, he boasts "I've only listened to a small minority of the audio so far. I intend to write posts about the contents of the tapes as warranted."  See here.

Engwers most comprehensive resource page for this paranormal fakery appears to be "The Enfield Poltergeist And Skepticism", but, as usual, he doesn't provide links to downloads of the audio, but instead boasts "After the digitizing of Guy Playfair's tapes was completed, I wrote a post about it."  LOL!  See here.

Let's just say that if Engwer were being prosecuted for murder in court, and the chain of custody for the incriminating recordings had all of the flaws the "Enfield tapes" do, Engwer would be screaming his head off that charges need to be dropped for lack of authentication.  We skeptics are not the least bit unreasonable to demand, before we turn over our entire lives to an invisible man, that the evidence in favor of the spirit world meets the highest tests of authenticity. Jason, did you forget that spiritual evil exists everywhere, and according to you, especially in the case of people who are considering taking the spirit world more seriously?

And so you think that believing some shit found on the internet should be "good enough" to pretend that the reviewer has been placed under an intellectual obligation to either confess the reality of the spirit world, or confess their bias against supernaturalism renders them unable to objectively evaluate the evidence?

So unless Engwer thinks the authentication tests required in a Court of law are unreasonably high, he cannot balk at skeptics who demand that checkable Affidavits of Authentication demonstrating a chain of custody and authentication accompany these alleged recordings from the 1970's, before there is any chance of this evidence foisting the least bit of moral or intellectual obligation upon a skeptic to 'explain' it.

Yes, that would make things impossible for Engwer, because the two girls who played this joke on paranormal investigators have never done what would otherwise be normal in court, and testified under oath to the authenticity of those tapes.  At most they visited the haunted house 40 years later, and they have appeared on talk programs, but they have never done anything remotely near as serious as testifying under oath.

So the truth is, you don't have the first fucking clue how much of such alleged audio is authentic and how much isn't.  Maybe Jason has a better idea, but that is hardly relevant to the skeptic, who isn't getting anything more from Engwer except endless trifles about how skeptics aren't dealing with certain details and have misinterpreted the evidence.

Release the properly authenticated Enflield recordings, Jason, or use up some brain cells trying to reconcile the obvious contradiction between your strong belief that this poltergeist was real, and your own refusal to release the relevant recordings.

NOW what are you going to do, Jason?  Maybe direct us to equally unauthenticated videos and audios "from the internet" ?

Since Jason cannot be accused of being retarded, it is certainly reasonable to infer that Jason's refusal to release the tapes is not due to oversight, but intention.  Well gee, if the tapes prove so much, why are you unwilling to release them?  Did you have a deal with SPR to keep the tapes private so other people could make money charging access fees?  What exactly?

Did you have a vision of God who told you to avoid writing down what the clouds said releasing the tapes?

LOL

Jason once said "The case and the tapes deserve further study."  See here.

Correction:  the case and the PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED tapes deserve further study.  Which apparently means they don't become deserving of further study until Jason decides that the unbeliever's peril in refusing to believe in the spiritual is so great as to "deserve" giving them Jason's best possible evidence...as opposed to his ceaselessly trifling about this shit as if he thinks it was the 28th book of the NT.

Jason's post at the Paranormal Detective YouTube channel from about January 2021 is:

Jason Engwer 

2 months ago 

Thanks for posting these clips. I've listened to all of the tapes, in their digitized form, and have posted a lot of articles on the contents of the tapes, if anybody is interested. Search for a post titled "The Enfield Poltergeist And Skepticism" at Triablogue. The tapes have a triple-digit number of hours of material, including a lot that hasn't been discussed publicly much or at all. The evidence for the case is much better than people typically suggest.

Then why aren't you releasing the full and properly authenticated audio?  Maybe you are afraid of bowling over the skeptics with so much evidence for the spiritual world that skeptics will start committing suicide?  YEAH RIGHT.  Triablogue exists for no other reason than to stomp down skeptical arguments.  So we are reasonable to believe that if you seriously believed the Enfield tapes proved your conclusions, you'd have uploaded them by now.  You've had since July 2018 to do this, but you haven't.  You forfeit your right to balk if skeptics become suspicious that you know your evidence is nowhere near as compelling as you pretend.

So now that we know Jason has all the tapes digitized, we have to wonder why he thinks it would be better for the world if they were only given mere tidbits of unauthenticated bits of the tapes here and there, downloadable without the slightest assurance of authenticity, interspersed with his endlessly trifling comments about how skeptics didn't account for this and that.  FUCK YOU.  

Saturday, October 24, 2020

My reply to “Five Reasons to Doubt the Resurrection by Matthew Hartke, Debunked”

 This is the reply to "scientific Christian's" defense of Paul's resurrection testimony, which I posted here.

The problems with Paul are legion, but for now:  I deny the Christian presupposition that we have some sort of "obligation" to believe whatever we read until we can prove it false.  Absent such obligation, I'm not seeing how the skeptic's complete apathy toward biblical evidence about apostle Paul breaks any rule of common sense, hermeneutics or historiography.  You won't be able to show such skeptical apathy to be "unreasonable".

And the case that the OT contradicts the NT concept of "hell" is solid, therefore, the concept of literal torture in literal hell fire is more than likely false, therefore, there is no "danger" to rejecting the gospel.  So even if Jesus really rose from the dead, why would it matter?  As an atheist I already happily embrace the permanent extinction of my consciousness at physical death.  On the other hand, I also see that adding "Jesus" to my life isn't limited to the good stuff constantly hawked by Christianity's carnival barkers.  It also means more uncertainty, rejection by one's church or social group, etc.  Too many Christians testify to sincere reservations about the whole Christianity business, to pretend that the skeptical rejection of the gospel is 100% unreasonable.  If I'm rejecting comfort and happiness, I'm also rejecting further sources of stress and misery.

Moroever, as is testified to by the millions of people who join "cults" (i.e., smaller Christian groups which Protestants say are a false form of Christianity), the skeptic is reasonable, if they wish, to completely avoid investigating any miracle claims.  You start investigating miracle claims, and you might end up in Mormonism, Jehovah's Witnesses, or some other "cult".  

Finally, skepticism is not some completely 100% bummer.  skepticism is also what keeps me away from those "cults", from Hinduism, from New Age, from wicca, etc, etc.  You don't be fairly representing skepticism unless you also affirm that it also operates to keep the skeptic free from all those other groups Christians say promote the doctrines of demons.

------------That's all I posted, but I'll now respond in more point by point fashion here:

Five Reasons to Doubt the Resurrection by Matthew Hartke, DebunkedThe first time I responded to someone’s attempt to show that the resurrection of Jesus amounted to a pile of myths was in 2018, when I dealt with the objections of Tim O’Neill. Tim O’Neill is an atheist and writes the History for Atheists blog which is, by far, the best blog that exists dealing with the misrepresentations of history offered by the rampant atheists flooding the internet and the atheist activists directing their thoughts. While O’Neill is basically impeccable when he talks about that sort of stuff, he’s much, much less impeccable when he turns his sights towards refuting Christianity.

I'll be glad to explain why apostle Paul poses not the least bit of threat to skepticism of Jesus' resurrection. 

In any case, a couple months ago I exchanged a few comments with Tim O’Neill and he directed me to a different argument against the historicity of the resurrection, published just earlier this year – Five Reasons to Doubt the Resurrection on Matthew Hartke’s blog. I admit, when I first read this, I was stumped myself. I thought about it for a while and I learned that the trick was simply to concede most of what Hartke was saying and then point out that all of this actually fails to give much good reason to doubt the resurrection at all.

But you are assuming you started out having good reasons to BELIEVE the resurrection in the first place.  You didn't.  A skeptic's case against the space-alien interpretation of the Bermuda Triangle might be false, but that hardly means that theory should be considered true.

Hartke’s article is divided into five sections, each of which are meant to show problems in the account of the historicity of the resurrection: 1) The nature of Paul’s conversion experience 2) Discord between the [Gospel] accounts 3) Signs of legendary development [in the Gospels] 4) Unrealistic features of the traditions 5) Dissonance reduction strategies. I’m going to begin by noting all the bad arguments in Hartke’s article, of which there are a number. In fact, section (1) and section (5) both fail.

Let’s start with what Hartke has to say about the nature of Paul’s conversion experience. I recommend first reading Hartke’s seciton itself. Here, Hartke is basically arguing that Paul’s letters and the Book of Acts indicates that the appearance of Jesus to Paul was simply a revelation, an internal vision, and so contradicts the standard narrative presented in the Gospels which presents the appearances of Jesus as physical and taking place in the real world. Hartke then says that we have no compelling reason to think that any of the historical appearances to any other of the early Christians were any different since, after all, Paul is the only firsthand testimony we have and Paul mentions all the appearances together in 1 Corinthians 15:3-8 anyways.

I don't argue that way.  I keep Jesus in the ground even assuming the gospel accounts are talking about physical resurrection external to the disciples' minds. 

Hartke is in fact completely wrong on each point here. First, he bases his claim that the appearance to Paul in Acts was not physical because Acts 26:19 calls it a “vision”. But this is irrelevant because Hartke is only taking the word “vision” in the modern sense of the word and fails to account for the possibility that an ancient might have understood a physical appearance that imparts direct theological knowledge as a vision.

Well first, Paul's experience on the road to Damascus is a non-starter, because nothing about any of Acts' three accounts of it express or imply that Paul ever actually "saw" Jesus, thus, those acounts cannot properly support any theory that Paul was an "eyewitness" of the risen Christ.

But the Greek word for vision in Acts 26:19 is optasia, a rare word that Paul himself uses to describe that one time when he was unable to properly understand whether his flying up into the sky was physical or spiritual.  See 2nd Corinthians 12:1-4.   Let's just say your resurrection witness isn't causing skeptics to piss themselves with worry that his credibility might remain intact.  If such fool were the prosecutions witness against you in a murder trial, you wouldn't ask the Court to give a jury instruction about the viability of the supernatural, you'd be asking for charges to be dropped since no reasonable juror could possibly find such witness the least bit credible.

In fact, if we bother to take a look at more then just one verse in Acts describing Paul’s appearance, Hartke’s thesis that Acts actually suggests nothing more than an internal vision for Paul becomes ridiculous.

"ridiculous" ?  No, it's more correct to say Acts describes Paul's experience in fantastic terms which both do and don't implicate internal vision.  If what Paul experienced was external to his mind, why couldn't the traveling companions understand it?  Apparently, the Jesus who appeared to Paul is very different from today's apologists who want to make the risen Christ obvious and undeniable to just anybody and everybody. 

All the resurrection appearances in Luke and elsewhere in Acts are undeniably physical (Luke 24; Acts 1:6–11, Acts 10:41), and so, at most, the appearances to Paul are, at best, a less clear example of a physical appearance.

I don't believe in biblical inerrancy, so I don't pretend that what an author said over here needs to be "reconciled" with what he said over there.  I accept the conclusion of Christian scholars that Christian scholars often contradict themselves or use inconsistent logic.  So my refusal to reject a theory merely because it doesn't account for something Luke said elsewhere, it not unreasonable.

Furthermore, the narratives of Paul’s appearance in Acts tell us that the appearances are physical.

But the inability of the traveling companions to understand Jesus' voice is a "fact" that is not limited to a single reasonable explanation.  You will insist Jesus intentionally prevented the traveling companions from properly understanding Him.  So apparently the risen Christ is less interested that his modern-day apologists to make his resurrection plain to just anybody and everybody.  I will insist that if the traveling companions couldn't understand the voice, it is because they didn't hear the voice to begin with, and Luke is simply taking the companions' naturalistic version of the story and embellishing it to help "account" for it without sacrificing the fantastic element Luke wants to push. 

Acts clearly didn’t think the appearance was restricted to Paul’s head since Acts narrates that the people travelling with Paul saw a light and heard a sound.

That's no more likely than the skeptical theory that Luke knew better, and by lying converted Paul's internal vision to an external experience.  Once again, you seem to think that because Acts says X, Y, and Z, then X, Y and Z impose an obligation upon the skeptic to presume they are true until they can be positively falsified.  Most apologists could use a lesson in historiography.  It doesn't begin with Aristotle's "dictum", a thing that never existed in the first place. 

In Acts 9:3, a light from heaven “flashed around him”. In Acts 9:7, the people with Paul “heard the sound” that spoke to Paul but “saw no one”. In Acts 22:9, the people travelling with Paul “see the light” and Paul ends up blinded for three days.

Yup, that's what Luke's version of the story says alright. 

So clearly, these accounts record something beyond Paul’s internal perception.

Because the account is truthful, or because Luke is taking Paul's solely internal vision and adding fictional details to make it sound more plausible and concrete? 

It’s also worth pointing out that the bright light that Paul and his travelers saw was coming from the physical Jesus, since the ancients thought that heavenly beings were very bright, and so this detail directly requires the physical Jesus to have been present to the group that Paul was in and was the source of the light.

The fact that non-Christian ancients believed this also justifies the skeptical theory that says Luke says "bright light" only because he, like Paul, wishes to embellish the more mundane historical truth so that the pagan Gentiles will find the account to be more acceptable to their religious proclivities.

See Dale Allison, “Acts 9:1–9, 22:6–11, 26:12–18: Paul and Ezekiel”, JBL (2016): 813-814. This fact also leads us to a misrepresentation in Hartke’s article: he says that the “usual apologetic response [to Acts 26:19 calling Paul’s appearance a “vision”] is to say that Paul’s word [in his letters] must take priority over Luke’s word here”. This is a complete misrepresentation. Firstly, the response is not apologetic, it is simply what the evidence says. Secondly, that’s not the response at all. The response is to point out that there is zero room for Paul experiencing nothing more than an internal vision according to the description in Acts if we bother to actually read the account of the appearances instead of selectively looking at a single throwaway verse (Acts 26:19) that appears later on.

The "room" we skeptics need to declare this experience as limited to Paul's mind is created by the story itself, which has Jesus speaking audibly to Paul while Paul's compansions cannot understand him.  If somebody told you that while they walked along the road with friends, suddenly, they heard the voice of Jesus in English, but the companions heard the voice and couldn't understanding, you probably wouldn't spend a great deal of time pretending the account is the least bit serious or compelling.

Then, Hartke argues that the appearance to Paul as described in his letters is also spiritual;

And yet even Paul himself, when recounting his conversion experience elsewhere, seems to use language more appropriate to a vision than to a physical appearance (Gal. 1:12, 16; cf., Gal. 2:2; 1 Cor. 14:6, 26; 2 Cor. 12:1, 7). In Galatians 1 he describes his experience as “a revelation of Jesus Christ,” using the same language he uses throughout his letters to describe non-bodily visions. The Greek word for “revelation” there is apocalypsis. It’s the same word he uses in 2 Corinthians 12 to describe his experience of being caught up to the “third heaven,” and in that case he says he doesn’t know whether it was “in the body or out of the body”. And in Galatians 1:16 he says that this revelation took place “in him”—not “to him”, but “in him”.

There are many problems here. First of all, Paul’s description of having a revelation “in him” is not inconsistent with the physical appearance of Paul recorded in Acts, where multiple people hear Jesus and see a light but the message is only understood by Paul.

And having a revelation "in him" is consistent with an internal vision. 

Secondly, Hartke does not address the evidence, perhaps he is unaware of it, that the appearance Paul writes about in his letters is physical and not only including a spiritual message.

That doesn't foist any intellectual obligation upon a skeptic.  Just because somebody makes it clear that they were at the store yesterday at precisely 9 p.m. doesn't obligate anybody to believe it. 

First of all, let’s begin by pointing out that the Greek word translated as “appeared” (ὤφθη) in 1 Cor. 15:8, where Paul is describing the appearances of Jesus, is not used elsewhere in his letters when describing purely internal revelations or visions such as in 2 Corinthians 12.

So you DO approve of arguments from silence.  

And once again, why are you pretending that Paul's different accounts must be harmonized?  Is there some rule of common-sense, hermeneutics or historiography, that says the reader is obligated to attempt all logically possible harmonization scenarios and make all the date fit together, before they can be reasonable to view the different accounts as contradictory?

And what fool ever said somebody must prove a contradiction with absolute certitude?  We can be reasoable to believe Paul's physical and non-physical descriptions are contradictory even if we can't prove it absolutely. 

Secondly, but even more importantly, Paul writes the following;1 Corinthians 15:8: and last of all he appeared to me also, as to one abnormally born.

Notice that Paul says “last of all” Jesus appeared to him. What does this mean? This means that Jesus stopped appearing to people after he appeared to Paul, so far as Paul is concerned.

then he disagrees with John the Revelator, whose visionary descriptions are worded in a way as to suggest that it was also what he was physically experiencing, and weren't completely mental. 

He was at the very end of the chain of the appearances of Jesus. But if Jesus was only giving Paul a purely internal vision and revelation of him, he was most certainly not the last person to experience an appearance of Jesus, and the appearance described in 1 Cor. 15:8 was most certainly not the last one. Jesus continues to appear in visions and revelations after the event described in 1 Cor. 15:8 transpires. Just look at 2 Corinthians 12:1-9.

That passage doesn't express or imply that Paul saw Jesus during that time. 

The only way for Paul’s appearance to have been the last one is if Jesus truly, literally appeared to him, because visions of Jesus don’t stop with Paul in 1 Cor. 15:-8, unlike appearances.

What is unreasonable about the skeptic who takes Paul's "last" to be contradictory to other NT appearances of Jesus?

Now, let’s move on to section (5): Dissonance reduction strategies. Hartke writes;

Of course, the disciples would have experienced Jesus’ death as more than just the loss of a loved one. After all, they had hoped that he was the long-awaited deliverer of Israel (Mk 8:29; Lk 24:21; Jn 1:41; Acts 1:6) and he was crucified precisely because he encouraged that association (Mk 14:61-62; 15:2, 26). As far as they were concerned, then, his death would have been experienced both as the loss of a dear friend and as a crushing blow to their eschatological expectations. Based on what we can tell from the sources, in other words, the situation of the disciples in the days after Jesus’ death was very similar to that of other apocalyptic movements after the failure of their eschatological expectations. Which invites the question: How do such groups typically respond in those situations? What usually happens when prophecy fails?

Here, Hartke is framing the death of Jesus as causing a sort of cognitive dissonance in the disciples. They had such massive, deep, and entrenched hopes in Jesus as the coming Messiah and whatnot and, all of a sudden, Jesus catastrophically is crucified by the Romans. What Hartke is implying is that, soon, the disciples, due to their inability to reconcile their expectations with reality, would simply have come to the belief that Jesus, who knows, was risen or something, and so their expectations were right all along! This doesn’t work. Though Hartke claims to have read N.T. Wright’s The Resurrection of the Son of God (2003), he seems to have forgotten that Wright already anticipates and refutes this line of reasoning. Just read pp. 697-701 of Wright’s book. Completely refuted, though Hartke doesn’t spend a word discussing Wright’s points. Let’s take a closer look at what Hartke says before refuting his cognitive dissonance theory yet again. Hartke goes on;

As it turns out, social psychologists and historians have been asking precisely this question for over half a century, and they haven’t come back empty-handed. In a 1999 survey of some of the most important studies on the social and psychological dynamics of failed prophecy, Jon R. Stone observes that “disappointed believers tend to adjust their predictions and beliefs both to fit such disconfirmations and to fit changing empirical conditions.” Instead of completely abandoning their expectations, apocalyptic groups tend to “reconceptualize the prophecy in such a way that the element of ‘failure,’ particularly the failure of the Divine to perform as promised, is removed.” The two primary ways they do this are (a) by reinterpreting the prophecy to better fit with reality through a process of “spiritualization” and/or partial fulfillment, and (b) by projecting the still-unfulfilled elements (usually the most important parts of the prophecy) into the future.

One of the best examples of this phenomenon is the response of the Millerites to William Miller’s proclamation that Christ would return to the earth on October 22, 1844—a date commonly referred to as the Great Disappointment. Like the disciples, many of the Millerites gave up everything in anticipation of the imminent arrival of the kingdom. After the expected day came and went, however, many Millerites came to believe that the prediction had in fact come to pass, but that instead of Christ coming to the earth as they previously thought, October 22, 1844 marked his entering the inner sanctuary in heaven in preparation for his return to the earth. These reinterpretations were accommodated by the creative exegesis of several biblical texts and bolstered by a series of visions reported by Ellen G. White—and they are now a central pillar of Seventh-Day Adventist theology.

The Millerites didn't run around with their leader for three years and then experience his death.  Failure of prophecy is not analogous to the traumatic news that one's revered religious leader has failed in his mission. 

Also instructive are the responses of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to the failure of their eschatological predictions in 1878, 1881, 1914, 1918, and 1925. Despite their initial disappointment, in all five of these instances the Witnesses discovered through a closer reading of Scripture that the predictions had, in fact, been partially fulfilled, or that significant developments related to the predictions had actually occurred on the dates in question. Unlike the original predictions, however, the “events” identified to substantiate this claim were of a heavenly (read: nonempirical) nature and therefore not open to falsification.

And Luke is guilty of making Paul's Damascus-road experience equally unfalsifiable by calling it a "heavenly" vision, Acts 26:19. 

Thus, 1878 marked the time when the “nominal Christian Churches were cast off from God’s favor”; 1881 marked the point at which “death became a blessing” to the saints; 1914, the year WWI began, marked the “End of the Time of the Gentiles” (i.e. the Christian nations); 1918 marked the moment Christ “entered the temple for the purpose of judgment”; and 1925 marked the establishment of a “New Nation” with Christ as its head. The unfulfilled portions of the original predictions were simply projected into the future.

No analogy.  death of a loved one is more personal, traumatic, and likely to cause cognitive dissonance, than simply proof that somebody's predictions were false. 

It’s clear Hartke doesn’t see the massive, gaping flaw in the examples he cites and how they fail to support his conclusion whatsoever that the disciples completely fabricated and deluded the idea of Jesus having risen from the dead after the crucifixion.

My theory is that the earliest resurrection belief was entirely spiritual in nature, and over time began to become more physical in order to make it less implausible. 

He talks about how both the Millerites and Jehovah’s Witnesses had predicted the coming of Jesus on a specific date and, when Jesus did not return on that specific date, they simply pushed the date back later. But this is not in the slightest analogous to the early Jesus sect. These people didn’t already believe that Jesus was going to return one day, let alone on a specific date. They had no concept of the Second Coming of Jesus, let alone the resurrection of Jesus. That Jesus was going to die at all is something that they did not anticipate. All Hartke’s examples show is that when some modern religious sect already believes that some prediction will be fulfilled at some specific point in time, and it isn’t fulfilled in that specific point in time, they just push back that same event to a later point in time. That’s it. That’s all his examples show. Now, when Hartke asks us what happens in religious sects “when prophecy fails”, he is alluding to Leon Festinger’s 1959 study When Prophecy Fails, the basic premise of which is described by Tim O’Neill (see where I quote O’Neill in my response to him here);

The classic psychological study of this phenomenon is Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken, and Stanley Schachter’s When Prophecy Fails, which analyses a case study of a UFO cult that expected the end of the world in December 1954. When the cataclysm and expected alien rescue for the believers did not eventuate, the core of the cult managed to reinterpret the failure into a victory by saying their faith had led God to spare the world. So total failure suddenly transformed into a great victory. We can see various other examples of this phenomenon – eg the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ repeated reinterpretations of their predictions of the end of the world when it failed to happen or the reaction of New Age believers when the recent “2012 Mayan Prophecy” turned out to be wrong.

That's precisely what happened in the case of Jesus.  he failed, he died, and the only way for the disciples to avoid having to admit it is to pretend Jesus rose from the dead.  Snip, jumping to:

As we’ve just seen, Hartke’s arguments on both Paul’s conversion experience and cognitive dissonance explaining the origins of the belief in the resurrection of Jesus fail. This brings us to sections 2-4 of Hartke’s article, which is more promising. Before citing Hartke’s arguments that are correct and cannot be simply refuted, I note a number of problems and errors in Hartke’s article in the three of these sections. Hartke writes;

There are no appearances in Mark, just the mysterious expectation of a meeting in Galilee (Mk 14:28; 16:7). 

There’s nothing “mysterious” about this expectation. Read it for yourself: Mark 14:28: “But after I have risen, I will go ahead of you into Galilee.” Or what about Mark 16:7: “But go, tell his disciples and Peter, ‘He is going ahead of you into Galilee. There you will see him, just as he told you.’” This is exremely straight forward and there are literally no mysteries.

Sure there are: authentic Mark doesn't ever say anybody saw the risen Christ, and most Christian scholars say Mark is the earliest gospel.  That makes it reasonable to say the more detailed resurrection narratives in the later gospels are mere legendary embellishments. 

In Mark 14:28, Jesus says He will rise from the dead and meet His disciples in Galilee.

I would deny that Jesus ever said that, so I'm not bothered by resurrection predictions in Mark, he was just as dishonest as John in putting in Jesus' mouth words Jesus never actually spoke...especially in a heresy-heavy climate where making Jesus say what you want would serve a purpose. 

In Mark 16:7, the angel

No, it is a "man" in a white robe, meaning other human beings had been to the tomb and opened it before the earliest witnesses, the women, got there. 

tells the women that Jesus has already risen from the dead and that they should tell His disciples that they are to meet Him in Galilee. Where’s the mystery? Hartke only calls it “mysterious” to make it sound more weird and (gasp) religious! so that he can dismiss it. What a joke. Hartke writes;

And the problem isn’t just the lack of corroboration between the accounts; it’s the numerous irreconcilable conflicts between them. At the end of Mark the women flee from the tomb and “said nothing to anyone, for they were afraid,” yet in Matthew they depart from the tomb “with fear and great joy, and ran to tell his disciples” (Mk 16:8; Mt 28:8).

Here, Hartke insinuates a contradiction between Mark and Matthew that has refuted by Licona (another author, besides N.T. Wright, that Hartke claims to have read);

Except that Mark wouldn't likely have ended with the silence of the women, if he seriously believed they eventually told other people.  Mark could just as easily have ended on that note because the earliest form of the story only had the women running away from the tomb.  There is nothing compelling the skeptic to grant probability to the Christian attempt to harmonize that ending with other gospel endings.  We are reasonable to draw inferences from Mark 16 alone, without worrying whether those inferences harmonize with later accounts which we skeptics believe are mere embellishments.

In Mark 16:8, the women fled from the tomb in fear and astonishment. And they said nothing to anyone, because they were afraid. However, in Matthew, Luke, and John, the women informed the disciples of the empty tomb. This appears to be a contradiction. However, a resolution is certainly possible;

But you don't win a bible debate by positing possibilities, otherwise, every theory that is "possible" would be a winner.  You either show the possibility you like is more probable than the theory you attack, or you aren't showing that skeptics are under the slightest intellectual compulsion to give a fuck. 

for example, earlier in Mark 1:44, Jesus told a man whom he had just healed of leprosy, “See that you say nothing to anyone. But go show yourself to the priest.” The command in both instances is very similar. Thus, it could be that Mark is saying, as implied in 1:44, that the women did not stop along the way to speak with anyone else but went directly to the disciples. (Licona, Why Are There Differences in the Gospels? Oxford University Press, 2016, 177.)

But it is also "possible" that the accounts seem to be contradictory...because they actually are.

So, what Mark actually says is “Trembling and bewildered, the women went out and fled from the tomb. They said nothing to anyone, because they were afraid” (16:8). Licona points out it’s pretty clear that, based on how Mark describes pretty similar commands elsewhere in the Gospels, we’re not being told that the women refused to listen to the angel because they were afraid of telling anyone, but that simply, on the way to go to the disciples, they did not tell anyone else.

The similarity argument is not persuasive enough to pretend that it imposes some obligation upon skeptics to either refute it or admit defeat.

Anyways, Hartke later writes;

Christian apologists often claim that the Gospels cannot contain significant legendary accretions because they were written within a generation of the events they ostensibly record, while legends generally take centuries to develop. Given the nature of the evidence we have, however, there is good reason for wondering whether this claim itself is an apologetically motivated myth.

To illustrate why, consider the resurrection narrative in one of the non-canonical sources, the Gospel of Peter, which most scholars (both liberal and conservative alike) date to the early or mid second century.

According to the Gospel of Peter, at the time of Jesus’ resurrection the tomb was being watched, not just by a couple guards as in Matthew, but by a whole troop of soldiers, a centurion named Petronius, the Jewish scribes and elders, and (just for good measure) by a “multitude from Jerusalem and the region round about” (31-33). All together this crowd witnessed “three men come forth from the tomb, and two of them supporting one, and a cross following them: and of the two the head reached unto the heaven, but the head of him that was led by them overpassed the heavens. And they heard a voice from the heavens, saying, ‘Hast thou preached to them that sleep?’ And a response was heard from the cross, ‘Yea’” (39-42).

Whatever their conclusions about the canonical Gospels, most scholars wouldn’t hesitate to say that Peter’s resurrection narrative is chock-full of legendary accretions, accretions that rest on but go far beyond earlier traditions (e.g. Matthew’s guards, Luke’s two angels). So whatever generalizations might be made about how long it usually takes for legends to develop, the Gospel of Peter (and the same point could be made from other non-canonical writings from around the same time) gives us a specific example that is directly relevant to the subject at hand.

And here’s the problem: Peter was written only a few decades after John. It stands, in fact, at relatively the same distance in time from John (the latest canonical Gospel) that Mark (the earliest canonical Gospel) stands from Jesus himself. So if we are in agreement that Peter’s resurrection narrative is largely legendary, by what rationale of dating can we still insist that the canonical Gospels must be categorically different?

This is a complete botching of logic. It makes no sense whatsoever. “The Gospel of Peter, written decades after any of the four Gospels, is full of mythology and whatnot. Therefore, we can’t say that the four Gospels are any different unless proven otherwise!” Huh?

I would never argue the way Hartke did. 

If Hartke wants to convince anyone besides the already convinced that the four Gospels contain legendary development, he’ll have to do so by showing that they actually include legendary development, not that decades later texts do.

That's easy, most Christian scholars accept Markan priority and say 16:8 is the end of authentic Mark, therefore, the reason later gospels describe people seeing the risen Christ is legendary development.  It is highly unlikely that Mark would have known that stuff to be historical fact and merely "chose to exclude it", if we allow the Christian assumption that the resurrection of Jesus is supposed to be the most important event in world history.  Mark wasn't quite as skippy about it as you are.

Hartke repeats this same point several more times in his article. Hartke writes;

Equally puzzling is why the appearances should be constrained to the days immediately following the crucifixion with few to none at all occurring soon afterward … And what about the high concentration of appearances early on followed by few or none at all soon afterward? To my knowledge, neither Wright nor any other proponent for the historicity of the resurrection has tried to explain why the risen Jesus should have stopped visiting his followers. And yet the literature on bereavement hallucinations shows us that “the number of recognized apparitions decreases rapidly in the few days after death, then more slowly, and after a year or more they become far less frequent and more sporadic.” Indeed, “The cases reported to us tend to occur most frequently within a week of the death, and the number falls away as the length of time since the death increases.”

This reason is not puzzling but actually very obvious. It’s called the Great Commission, Hartke, the idea that, in the aftermath of Jesus’s death and resurrection, He appeared to several important disciples and figures so that He would both show them who He is and commission to then, themselves, take the message of the cross to the rest of the world.

The point of the appearances was to commission the movement that is Christianity today, which now holds the responsibility of bringing the message to the rest of the world.

I disagree.  Jesus was the leader of the Judaizers, and the Christianitys of today are a far cry from the mere extension of Judaism that was original Christianity.  It wouldn't matter if the bible was the inerrant word of God, no Christianity of today fits the mold apparently intended by Jesus, which is not a problem skeptics need to reconcile with an inerrant bible, they only need be reasonable to say it looks like Jesus' mission failed. 

It’s as simple as that. Jesus doesn’t need to keep appearing because the point was to create the movement and let it spread.

But you don't know that Jesus stopped appearing for that reason.  He could have stopped appearing because the Christian fabricators recognized how implausible the story would be if they kept saying Jesus was repeatedly appearing to others.  If you've ever watched a trial, then you recognize full well that just because an excuse is plausible, doesn't mean it is "correct". 

And it did. There are over 2 billion Christians now, though there were less than 20 at that time.

You wouldn't have any Christianity if Constantine hadn't criminalized non-Christian religions and given Christianity a political shove in the 4th century.

Now that we’ve noted all the errors in sections 2-4 of Hartke’s article, let’s take a look at Hartke’s good arguments;

There are no appearances in Mark, just the mysterious expectation of a meeting in Galilee (Mk 14:28; 16:7). Only Matthew tells of an appearance to the eleven disciples on a mountain in Galilee (Mt 28:16-17). Only Luke tells of an appearance to a pair of disciples on the road to Emmaus (Lk 24:13-31), and he is the only one who narrates the ascension (Lk 24:51; Acts 1:9). Only John tells of the appearances to Thomas and the seven disciples by the Lake of Galilee (Jn 20:24-29; 21:1-22). In none of the Gospels do we see an appearance to James or the “more than five hundred brothers” mentioned by Paul (1 Cor 15:6-7). And of all the things the risen Jesus is reported to have said, only one stock phrase—“Peace be with you”—is recorded by more than one Gospel writer (Lk 24:36; Jn 20:19). How could memories diverge so widely on something as unforgettable as the words of the Messiah from beyond the grave?

Mark’s Jesus tells the disciples that he will meet them in Galilee,

But it is still unreasonable to presume that Mark would desire to leave the fulfillment of such details unmentioned.  After all, weren't the disciples (thus Peter, mark's alleged source) "amazingly transformed" by Jesus' resurrection?   

and he does so in Matthew, but Luke’s Jesus appears only in or around Jerusalem, and he actually tells the disciples not to leave the city (Mk 14:28; 16:7; Mt 28:16-17; Lk 24:6-7, 49). In Luke, moreover, all the appearances take place on Easter day, while in Acts they take place over a forty day period! What are we to make of such a mess?

Even Mike Licona, a conservative Baptist scholar, tacitly admits this, citing the angel(s) at the tomb and the resurrection of the saints in Matt. 27:52-53 as possible examples of what he (euphemistically?) calls “a literary device” on the part of the Gospel writers, which they employ to drive home “their belief that a divine activity had occurred.”

But what Licona and others like him fail to do, despite all their best efforts, is to show how these “literary devices” are not part of a larger trend of legendary development. If the Gospel of Peter can turn Matthew’s two guards into a hundred, then why can’t Matthew (or Matthew’s source) be just as creative? Why can’t the two guards be another example of the elasticity of ancient biographical standards, showing Matthew’s belief that a divine activity had occurred? Given the lack of independent corroboration for that detail, and the clear apologetic value it holds for Matthew’s narrative, there is good reason for thinking that it too is probably legendary.

But then the floodgate is opened and it can’t be shut. If we can attribute the bodies of the saints coming out of their tombs and appearing to many in Jerusalem to Matthew’s creative license, then why can’t we do that with any of Jesus’ appearances? John’s story of Jesus’ appearance by the Lake of Galilee (Jn. 21:1-17) bears so much similarity to Luke’s story of Peter’s first encounter with Jesus (Lk. 5:1-11) that it becomes quite sensible to ask whether one of the authors moved the story to a different setting for their own literary purposes, or even if this might be the result of memory-conjunction error, the combining of two separate memories to create one hybrid memory. And what about the anachronistic content of Jesus’ final words in Matthew? Or the 40 days of Acts? Or the ascension narrative? And on and on the questions come.

And aside from the suspiciousness of any one tradition, there is the more general observation that the scope of post-resurrection material grows with each Gospel: Mark is the earliest, and he contains no actual record of any appearances, but only the expectation of one in Galilee (Mk 16:7); then comes Matthew, who spends 190 words on two appearances (Mt 28:9-20) and then Luke, who spends 641 words on three appearances (Lk 24:13-53); and finally John, who spends 930 words on four appearances (Jn 20:14-21:25).

One of the more puzzling features of the resurrection narratives is how the appearances of the risen Jesus are all short-lived and sporadic: Jesus appears in the middle of a room, gives a brief word of comfort or exhortation, and then disappears just as quickly as he appeared (Lk 24:31, 36-37; Jn 20:19, 26).

None of this requires any refutation. All one has to do, at this point, is point out that all of Hartke’s evidence of development or legendary features only applies to the Gospels of Matthew, Luke, and John. These are traditions that develop beyond the account in Mark and may very well contain literary imagination.

But if so, we can reasonably infer that Mark himself would have felt equally as free to embellish truth for theological purpose. 

Of course, the historicity of the resurrection is generally argued for on the basis of the evidence we find in Paul’s letters and Mark alone. Consider Michael Licona’s The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (2010).

I have, and I have refuted it comprehensively. 

Hartke says he’s read it in the beginning of his article, but this whole mass of objections just quoted doesn’t apply to literally any of Licona’s evidence. It’s completely untouched.

Wrong:  if Licona can admit Matthew and John changed some of the facts, then apparently, changing historical facts to suit theology was considered acceptable by 1st century Christians and we can reasonably infer that Mark felt the same way. 

In other words, Hartke has simply failed to respond to the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus as adduced by either N.T. Wright or Michael Licona, or anyone else, for that manner.

he didn't need to, as only three of the NT accounts of Jesus' resurrection are first-hand at best (Matthew, John and Paul), the rest is vision or hearsay.  That's a pretty sad case for proving a miracle from 2,000 years ago, especially if we pepper this sad case with accusations from Licona, such as that Matthew's zombies are fiction and John's Christ-sayings tell us more about John's theology and less about what Jesus actually said.  And more especially if we concede with most conservative scholars and Licona and Mcgrew that the gospels don't give us the ipsissima verba (actual words) , but only the vox (gist).  

if you found out that the witness who authored the affidavit now used against you in a murder trial, took the same type of liberties in her "recollection" of "facts", you would make a motion to have the case dismissed on the grounds that no reasonable jurors could possibly find beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty.

My reply to Bellator Christi's "Three Dangerous Forms of Modern Idolatry"

I received this in my email, but the page it was hosted on appears to have been removed  =====================  Bellator Christi Read on blo...