Showing posts with label apologetics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label apologetics. Show all posts

Saturday, November 18, 2023

Jonathan McLatchie's fallacies in explaining away Divine Hiddenness

This is my reply to Dr. Jonathan McLatchie's article at crossexamined.org entitled

One of the most challenging objections to the existence of God is the problem of divine hiddenness. Closely related to the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness asks “Where is God?”; “Why doesn’t God make His existence more obvious?”; “Why does God leave any room for doubt?” Surely God, if He existed, would not need apologists to make the case for His existence — couldn’t He have made it more immediately apparent? Related to these concerns is the problem of unanswered prayer. Why do so many peoples’ prayers go unanswered, often despite years of persistent prayer? The problem is even connected to the problem of evil, since one may ask why God apparently fails to show up to put an end to evil and unjust suffering in our world. These are indeed difficult questions that deserve to be taken seriously and thoughtfully considered.

So if your article doesn't persuasively refute the hiddenness objection, we can reasonably deduce that even after you tried your best, you couldn't show the alleged fallaciousness or illegitimacy of the hiddenness objection.

The Biblical authors also recognized and grappled with divine hiddenness. For example, the Psalmist asked “Why, O LORD, do you stand far away? Why do you hide yourself in times of trouble?” (Ps 10:1). Another Psalm likewise says “Awake! Why are you sleeping, O Lord? Rouse yourself! Do not reject us forever! Why do you hide your face? Why do you forget our affliction and oppression? For our soul is bowed down to the dust; our belly clings to the ground. Rise up; come to our help! Redeem us for the sake of your steadfast love!” (Ps 44:23-26). One could continue in a similar vein for some time.

Which is why you Christians are accomplishing nothing if and when you quote something in the bible in response to the divine hiddenness objection.  The biblical authors offered nothing more serious than the persistence of their faith.  Gee, God really exists, because nothin's gonna stop us now?  LOL. 

The problem of divine hiddenness is, in my judgment, one of the best arguments against the existence of God.

You are a 5-point Calvinist who says presuppositionalism isn't biblical.  Your presuppositionalist brothers in Christ think you are sinfully deaf to the Holy Spirit, because neither the bible nor god will allow that some atheist arguments are "better" than others.  Is there a reason why you don't just say "you can't account for the pre-conditions of intelligibility" and then wait to see the world come to a grinding halt?  That's what your friends Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, James White, Jeff Durbin and Sye Bruggencate do.  Does God want you all to disagree on how robust some atheist objection is?  Does God want his followers to disagree with each other on whether presuppositionalism is biblically justified?

It has its most articulate and erudite defense, to my knowledge, in the work of Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg (see his book The Hiddenness Argument — Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God).[1]

The problem is particularly difficult on an emotional level. Schellenberg draws the analogy of a friend describing his parents: “Wow, are they ever great — I wish everyone could have parents like mine, who are so wonderfully loving! Granted, they don’t want anything to do with me. They’ve never been around. Sometimes I find myself looking for them — once, I have to admit, I even called out for them when I was sick — but to no avail. Apparently they aren’t open to being in a relationship with me — at least not yet. But it’s so good that they love me as much and as beautifully as they do!”[2] This analogy should give a sense of the impact of this argument, rhetorically and emotionally.

The analogy indicates that the only way you are ever going to justify pretending some "god" wants a "personal" relationship with us is if you radically redefine "personal", when in fact your solitary basis for doing so is to avoid having to admit the Christian religion is false.  You know?  This is sort of like radically redefining "billionaire" so a homeless destitute man can still "plausibly" claim to be financially secure.

While it may be admitted that the argument from divine hiddenness is one of the most perplexing issues for the theist to come to terms with, especially emotionally, the real question that needs to be addressed is that of whether it offers sufficient ground to overhaul the powerful cumulative positive reasons to believe that God exists and that He has revealed Himself through Jesus Christ. I will argue in this article that the answer is ‘no’.

Then you missed the forest for the trees.  If God does not do what would fall within the parameters of "desire a personal relationship with us", then his existence is rendered irrelevant.  A man with a bright orange hat no doubt truly exists somewhere in Sudan right now.  But his mere existence is hardly sufficient to justify inferring that he wants to be in a personal relationship with you.  Some neo-evangelical fuckheads will say the "personal relationship" stuff is merely the fruit of apostate Christianity, and true discipleship consists solely of prayer and obedience.  But we call victory if we can justify ignoring the most popular version of theism/Christianity.

A Lack of Obviousness Does Not Mean Poor Evidential Support

Yes it does.  The more obvious something is, the more evidential support there will be.  The less obvious something is, the less evidential support.  It is far from obvious that Bigfoot is a genuine cryptid, there is a remarkable lack of evidential support that this thing being a real animal.  Your statement might be reasonable if you are talking about just any evidence that might blow in from any direction.  But if you are talking about seriously "authenticated" evidence, then your maxim is most certainly false.  How much of the evidence in favor of Bigfoot being a genuine cryptid, is seriously "authenticated"?  The vast majority of BF fanatics are not willing to assert their claims under penalty of perjury, and one might be reasonable to say such unwillingness means the evidence in question is not properly authenticated.  We might have higher standards of evidence than the average fool on the internet, but so what?  Having high standards of evidence only means you are forced to come up with a seriously good case, it doesn't mean we are being "unfair".  Otherwise, any guilty criminal suspect could complain the standard of evidence he is being forced to meet by the prosecutor's grilling questions on the stand is "unfair" and the standard "should be" lower.  Not on your life.  Furthermore, it is precisely the failure to have a higher standard that is responsible for many people being defrauded and conned.  When we are dealing with an unknown and thus a possible fake, the only people who complain that our standards are too high are the fools who cannot justify their own lower standards.

Why does God not make His existence more obvious?

We say it is for the same reason the tooth-fairy doesn't make her existence more obvious.  The only difference is that one is clearly limited to children, the other appears to be a fairytale intended for adults. 

The first point I will make in response to this question is that God’s existence not being obvious does not entail that it is not well evidentially supported. We know from physics, for example, that a physical object like a table or a chair is comprised of mostly empty space. This is not at all obvious (in fact it would seem to be almost obvious that it is not the case) and yet we have good evidential support that it is so.

This means that "obvious" may be grounded in mere perception, or study.  Before the age of enlightenment, a person would have been reasonable to think a chair was a "solid" object and to insist that the theory of the chair being mostly empty space lacked evidentiary support.  Similarly, before the age of enlightenment, a person might have been reasonable to attribute certain natural phenomena to "god".  What's "obvious" reasonably depends on the current state of knowledge.

One may reply that whereas we know scientifically that the chair is mostly comprised of empty space, we nonetheless still live our lives as if though it is not — our day-to-day choices and beliefs are not based on how we scientifically understand things to be, but how we experience them in our daily lives. However, I can think of counter-examples where we do act against what we feel in accord with the available evidence, even when we are putting our lives on the line. For example, despite being a frequent flyer, I get anxious about being on an airplane. Even though I know rationally that flying is the safest way to travel (statistically, your odds of being involved in a fatal plane crash are less than 1 in 12 million), flying – especially in turbulent conditions – just doesn’t feel like it is safe to me. Nevertheless, I frequently overcome my fear of flying by stepping onto an airplane, often for very long distances. In that case, I am literally committing my life to what my rational faculties tell me, and disregarding what my emotions and feelings tell me, because I know that generally my rational faculties are a more reliable gauge of what is actually true than my feelings.

Statistics don't tell you what is actually true, that's why they change all the time.  All they do is highlight trends.  You've heard the expression "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics".

Someone recently asked me why God cannot be more like the force of gravity, which we experience directly. However, while we do have direct experience of the effects of gravity, it is not immediately obvious what causes things to gravitate towards the ground.

The point is not being able to figure out the mechanism, but being able to prove that some such mechanism must obviously be present to account for the phenomena.  God could cause severe headache or body ache to all persons when they are 1 minute away from committing a crime.  We would then notice that those who wish to commit crime exhibit this trend, and we could deduce a moral creator from it even if we couldn't fully explain how the non-physical god manages to influence the movement of physical things like neurons.

The law of gravity was not articulated before Isaac Newton (1642-1727). Indeed, in attempting to explain why unsupported bodies fall to the ground, the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle put forward the idea that objects simply moved towards their ‘natural place’, the center of the earth (which in Aristotle’s cosmology was the center of the Universe), and that objects fall at a speed proportional to their weight. So perhaps gravity is less ‘obvious’ than one might think (though something which nonetheless enjoys strong evidential support). I would argue that the evidence of God is all around us, so we do in a sense experience God in a similar way to how we experience gravity. Just as we observe the effects that gravity has all around us but do not see the gravitational force that actually causes those effects, we also see the many things that God has made all around us, even though we do not see the being who actually caused those things to exist.

Not at all.  Science continues coming up with sufficient purely naturalistic explanations for phenomena previously unexplainable.  Abiogenesis is next on naturalism's hit-list.

One may still object here that it should not take us a lot of work to discover that Christianity is true. Rather, the truth of the gospel, granting what is at stake, should be readily apparent. I shall return to this objection in due course. However, I will note here that I do not think God requires more than it is reasonable for a serious enquirer to give to an issue of this much importance.

Then because I can reasonably justify ignoring the gospel, that is the point where your apologetics break down, and thus the point where you walk away defeated. 

Some enquirers are better placed than others, and God looks for us to exert ourselves according to the light we have been given.

You must be talking solely to Christians, you cannot just sneak in what you think is a biblical "truth" (we are accontable to God based on how much "light" he has allowed to us) and expect it to be found persuasive by a non-Christian. 

I have heard, for instance, many stories of Jesus revealing Himself to people in dreams and visions in Muslim-majority countries, presumably since those are parts of the world where it is harder for people to otherwise hear the gospel. In the west, we have ample access to the gospel and to the tools needed to do our due diligence in investigating its claims.

But visions and dreams are more persuasive than historical evidence.  How many people would be denying Christianity if God gave a Jesus-vision to everybody? You lose.

I think we have to trust the goodness of God,

Yup, you have no intention of addressing unbelievers at that point.

 since presumably God, in his omniscience, knows what every person would have done had they had more evidence — i.e. whether they would have chosen to enter into a relationship with God or to reject Him. 

So because Matthew 11:21 has Jesus saying earlier civilizations surely "would have" repented had they been allowed to see the miracles Jesus was doing for 1st century people, we are forced to the conclusion that even when God knows that more evidence "would have" resulted in more being getting saved, God will still withhold that evidence, i.e., God does not wish to save everybody, i.e., totally consistent with your Calvinism...thus making everybody wonder why the anti-Calvinist Dr. Frank Turek would ever let a person like you represent his crossexamined.org ministry.  Maybe you are one of those "Calvinists" who think God wants to be surprised and find that several non-elect people managed to get saved anyway? 

We know from plenty of Biblical examples that not everyone who is presented with conclusive evidence for God (whether by miracles, predictive prophecies, or direct manifestations) submits to Him.

Then Matthew 11:21 is a serious problem for you.  Jesus said those earlier civilizations "would have" repented had they seen the miracles Jesus was doing.  There is no "maybe" in Jesus' dogmatic words there. 

If God knows that a given individual is not going to enter into a good, lasting relationship with Him, then why would God ensure the person believes?

But if God is all-powerful, he can cause the most incorrigably stubborn unbeliever to become a believer.  The strongest biblical case in point is Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus.  Paul had not previously repented, he was still whole-heartedly persecuting Christians when God allegedly decided to give him both theological barrels right to the face.  If the biblical god is serious in his boasts that "all things" are possible for him (Matthew 19:26), then spiritually regenerating a determined atheist would be a piece of cake...just like keeping safe the toddler who refuses to move from the middle of the street is a piece of cake, because the power we have as their caretakers is greater than their stubbornness.  Love requires that we force them against their wills when we reasonably foresee that allowing them to have their way will likely result in disaster.

Furthermore, Scripture also indicates that people are judged in accordance with the amount of light they have rejected (e.g. Mt 11:21-22; Jn 12:47-48).

Another proof that you are not addressing atheists or unbelievers, so that you cannot complain if such groups find your arguments pathetically weak. 

Even many contemporary public atheists have essentially said that no amount of evidence could change their mind. For example, Richard Dawkins was asked in a conversation with Peter Boghossian what it would take for him to believe in God. Dawkins said that not even the second coming would be enough evidence. When Boghossian asked him whether any amount of evidence could change his mind. He replied, “Well, I’m starting to think nothing would, which, in a way, goes against the grain, because I’ve always paid lip service to the view that a scientist should change his mind when evidence is forthcoming.” It could, therefore, be seen as an act of mercy for God to withhold from them more evidence if they were going to reject it anyway and thereby bring upon themselves greater judgment.

But if God foisted on Dawkins that efficacious telepathy God boasts of having in Ezra 1:1, Dawkins would no more likely resist doing what God wanted than pagan idolator King Cyrus would resist conforming to what god wanted.   Maybe we should change Romans 1:20 so that it says "God is without excuse, because when he really wants to, he can cause even the most stubborn unbeliever change their mind and become willing to obey the divine intent".

This adds yet further plausible motivation for God not to ensure that everyone had greater access to evidence for His existence, which would thereby render them more culpable.

Except that Jesus in Matthew 11:21 assured us that prior civilizations "would have" repented if they had seen more evidence.  So from a biblical perspective, God is not withholding evidence because he wants to lessen their culpability...he is withholding evidence because he doesn't want them to repent. 

This point has been independently made by Travis Dumsday in a paper in the journal Religious Studies.[3]

He is trumped by the word of God.  That's enough to convince you.

This last point may be challenged by the skeptic by pointing to the existence of non-resistant non-believers. As Schellenberg puts it, “If there exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with any finite person, then no finite person is ever nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists.”[4] However, I would contest that there is such a thing as long-term non-resistant nonbelief. My own view is that the evidence for Christianity is such that anyone who is fully informed and takes it upon himself to impartially examine it — with a heart open toward accepting God as Lord — will, in the long term, come to find Christianity to be true and well supported.

Perhaps your desire to continue believing in such a blind hopeless way about unbelievers explains why you reject a lot of debate invitations from them, like when you rejected mine for reasons that were outrageously irrelevant to the merits, see here.

In any case, human psychology, particularly at the subconscious level, is so complex that I doubt that it is demonstrable that any nonbeliever is completely nonresistant.

Your first concern is your bible, not human psychology, and there, God apparently wants people to think that his sovereignty over the choice-making abilities of human beings is aptly illustrated by the analogy of hooking a fish and forcing it to go in a direction it didn't wish to go.  See "hook in your jaws" in Ezekiel 38-39.  What is so unreasonable in taking that metaphor to mean God not only has the capability of forcing people against their will, he is also willing to actually do it?  Bible inerrancy is rejected by most Christian scholars, so you can hardly pretend that an unbeliever is under some type of obligation to presume that the only interpretation of a bible verse that can possibly be correct is the one that harmonizes with everything else in the bible.  There' nothing the least bit unreasonable in concluding that Ezekiel's hard determinism contradicts what other biblical authors believed. 

Couldn’t God Have Given Us Stronger Evidence?

A related objection is that it is possible for the evidence for Christianity to have been stronger than it in fact is. Surely, if God existed, He would have given us the strongest possible evidence. However, I do not think that we need expect something that goes beyond perfectly adequate evidence for the serious inquirer.

I have no patience for this type of red-herring.  We are not asking you whether the evidence available to the modern day atheist is "sufficient" to justify holding them accountable on Judgment Day.  We are asking whether God could have provided more and better evidence.  The answer is yes, and Matthew 11:21 ensures that God knew prior civilizations would surely have repented had they been given more evidence.  But a better rebuttal would argue that your god's problem is not whether he could provide better evidence, but why he refuses to foist on today's idolators that coercive telepathy that he foisted on King Cyrus to ensure he would obey the divine will, Ezra 1:1.  Whenever the bible asserts that God made somebody willing, or "stirred up their spirit", they ALWAYS do exactly what he wants them to do.  Yes, we need to change Romans 1:20 so it says "god is without excuse, he could avoid any need to bitch about people about sinning by simply preventing them from sinning". 

Many atheists are under the mistaken impression that God wants people to believe in Him no matter what they are going to go on and do with that knowledge.

No, you are creating a completely fabricated problem: If God foisted his saving grace on everybody, they would not merely get saved...they would also use that knowledge in whatever way God wanted them to.  God is without excuse. 

It is never contended anywhere in Scripture that it is a commendable thing to believe in God yet reject a relationship with Him.

And it is never contended anywhere in Scripture that God might cause somebody to believe in him but still reject a relationship with him. The power that cause belief also causes willingness to enter a relationship.  God is without excuse. 

In the Old Testament, the Jews had no doubt that God existed – they had seen many miracles performed before their eyes – and yet they went off time and again into idolatry.

That analogy doesn't work with atheists, because we deny that such Jews ever saw any miracles in the first place.  That's why they found it impossibly difficult to fear YHWH enough to stay separate from the Canaanites. 

Even those who saw Jesus’ miracles before their very eyes didn’t believe in Him (e.g. John 12:37) and wanted to put Him to death – e.g. see the reaction of many after Jesus raised Lazarus (John 11:45-53).

The bible correctly reports that some people thought Jesus' miracles were total bullshit...but it incorrectly reports that those miracles were genuinely supernatural.  In this I violate standard of historiographical convention no more than does the jury who decides that some portions of a witness's testimony are truthful and other portions are lies. 

The eighteenth century lawyer and Christian thinker Joseph Butler (1692-1752), in his Analogy of Religion, put forward the idea that our time on earth is a period of probation.[5]

You are a Calvinist.  You think God's foreknowledge is exhaustive and infallible.  In that case, there can be no "probation" because God is not waiting to see what we will do.  If God doesn't think we are capable of doing anything other than what he infallibly foresees us doing, then our internal sense of unpredictability and autonomy is genuinely illusory...there was never any "if" about it in the first place, and therefore, putting us on "probation" in this life would be about as sensible as putting a toddler on probation in front of a trigonometry textbook to see "if" they will get the right answers.  Only a fool would expect obedience when by other means he already infallibly knows it will never happen.  Most Christians will agree with me that there is straight up irreconcilable contradiction between Calvinism's doctrine of God's revealed will and Calvinism's doctrine of God's secret will.  Nothing is more dishonest than the Calvinist bitching at people for sinning, because Calvinism says their sins were in perfect conformity to God's will (secret will).  The utter stupidity of such a God is clear from Paul's inability to coherently answer that problem in Romans 9:20. 

For some people in particular the form that that probation may take is a form of testing whether they are willing to engage in the intellectual inquiry that is necessary to give themselves a fair examination of the evidence.

"whether"?  If God already knows infallibly how they will react to the test, then its not really "probation", is it?  If you know infallibly that an imprisoned man will rape soon after being put on probation, then your releasing him isn't really "probation", is it?  Probation only makes sense when the person in charge has hopes that we will pass the test, and cannot the outcome beforehand.

An objection I sometimes encounter is that, if God exists, then there should not be any reasonable arguments against His existence at all. However, this complaint, it seems to me, boils down essentially to the dubious claim that, if Christianity is true, there cannot be any puzzles that require mental effort to work out.

The objection is wise, it shows that if God exists and yet it isn't obvious, then this God apparently prioritizes toying with people above seriously wanting them to avoid spiritual disaster.  If God is playing hide and seek with us, either we are not in spiritual trouble, or this God is sadistic, because it is precisely this game that causes some people to allegedly endure eternal conscious suffering in an afterworld. Had God been a bit more serious, there wouldn't have been any hide and seek, God's will would have been as obvious as the existence of trees, and we have no right to pretend that the level of sin in that world would still be equal to the level of sin in the present world where this god desires to play hide and seek.

Another point to bear in mind is that many people are not even presented with these as puzzles that seriously compromise the evidence that they already have. For some people, working through the problem of evil is part of their probation here in this life.

Some would argue that insulating a child from rape is more important than some adult's "Probation" in this life.  The only reason any fool insists that "God is an exception" are those who refuse to give up belief in god's "goodness". 

And if they are diligent, they will work through it.

This is blind denial of the obvious truth that many Christians are diligent and yet don't work through it, and often de-convert. 

Even if they cannot find adequate and satisfying answers to why there exists so much suffering in the world, they can learn to trust in the goodness of God, and find in the problem of evil insufficient ground to overturn the positive confirmatory case for Biblical theism.

We aren't using evil to disprove theism.  We are using evil to disprove the doctrine of God's "goodness". 

Either they will find adequate answers, or they will find enough positive evidence to make the fact of their inability to find those answers not, in the end, sufficient to undermine their faith.
Why Does God Require of Us So Much Work?

Again, you address only Christians.  The unbeliever would never concede that god requires anything of anybody.

I often hear the objection that in order to really be compelled by the evidence for Christianity, one has to take a very deep dive into esoteric scholarship. Surely, if God were real, the truth of the gospel should be a lot more self-evident. Indeed, this is actually also an objection to my epistemology that I frequently encounter from some Christians as well – namely, that my hard line evidentialism implies that Christians cannot be rational in believing the gospel unless they become an academic and invest hundreds of hours in the study of the evidences for Christianity. Since not everyone has the aptitude and access to resources necessary to undertake such deep study, so the objection goes, this cannot be God’s normative way of imparting rational confidence to believers that the gospel they have entrusted is indeed true.
However, I want to be careful here to draw a distinction between what I call an explicit rational warrant and what can be called an implicit, or tacit, rational warrant for Christian faith.

Mere reasonableness of the Christian view cannot itself displace or disprove the reasonableness of the atheist view, because two opposite viewpoints may possibly be equally reasonable.  It's the reason why not all equally reasonable people on a jury will agree, so that they end up in deadlock.  Reasonableness does not work the way accuracy does. 

Every Christian, I would argue, can have at least an implicit rational warrant for believing that God exists and that He has revealed Himself in the Bible. Romans 1:20 teaches that God’s “invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.” The Greek word translated “without excuse” in this verse is ἀναπολογήτους (literally, “without an apologetic”). Furthermore, the Psalmist wrote that “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his handiwork,” (Ps 19:1). I do not think the Scriptures are envisaging people having to do PhDs in astrophysics or molecular biology, or master probability theory, in order to see the hand of God revealed in nature. Every time we step outdoors and behold the things that God has made – especially living organisms – we intuit that things have been made for a purpose, even if we couldn’t explicitly express why that is the case. Indeed, throughout history, the vast majority of people who have lived have been theists.

And the vast majority of people in human history lived before the age of science.  The progress of science is precisely why church attendance dwindles every year and Christians come back from college with liberal or no faith.  If the internet had existed in the first century, Christianity would never have gotten off the ground.  

This implicit or inarticulate sense of the case for theism explains, I think, why some people come to believe that there must be a God when they hold their newborn child in their arms for the first time – they see the incredible design and elegance that is inherent in the process of development from a fertilized egg to a new born infant. They recognize, even if only implicitly and intuitively, that this is a process that required a high level of foresight to bring about – since it involved a high-level objective – which points to the involvement of a conscious mind in the programming of developmental pathways.

And the vast majority of people who behold their newborns, lack advanced education in abiogenesis and philosophy.  

Those with an implicit rational warrant for belief in God may not be able to hold their own in a debate with a learned atheist scholar. This is why we hear so many ill-formulated attempted arguments for God that are along the right lines but not sufficiently nuanced to pass for sound argumentation.

But at least they tried.  You?  You don't even dare tangle with somebody who directly challenged you in a scholarly polite manner. 

But I would argue that they nonetheless have sufficient rational warrant for their belief that God exists. Over time, as a believer matures, I would argue that the rational warrant for belief that was in the first place implicit should become more and more explicit and articulate.

Unfortunately, that cannot be the case, with all these older mature Christian apologists running around, who do not have cases for theism any more mature than the implicit warrant arguments you just mentioned.  Turek's typical I Don't Have Enough Faith To Be An Atheist lectures do little more than confirm to me that Christianity's best efforts cannot survive scrutiny.  Although I have massive respect to him for being willing to answer random questions during Q&A.

In fact, even a biologist as staunchly atheistic as Francis Crick (co-discoverer with James Watson of the double-helical structure of DNA) said that “Biologists must constantly keep in mind that what they see was not designed, but rather evolved,”[6] Richard Dawkins similarly said at the beginning of The Blind Watchmaker that “Biology is the study of complicated things that have the appearance of having been designed with a purpose,”[7] Dawkins then spends the remainder of the book trying to argue, in my opinion unsuccessfully, that this design is not real but only apparent.

I have a tougher version of atheism.  I don't argue God doesn't exist.  I argue that God is irrelevant.  By taking that position, not only do we spare the audience 90,000 pages of pointless ID back-and-forth, we jump right to the one thing that you couldn't prove even if necessary to save your life...that god is relevant.

People also have a moral compass and have an implicit sense that there are objective moral norms and duties in the world – something which makes much better sense if theism is true than if atheism were true.

Probably because most of them have not engaged in the study of moral philosophy.  They are totally caught off guard by the "why is child rape wrong" or "why is causing sexual pain to a child wrong" questions and blindly commit to the notion that only "god" can explain why it is wrong. 

Besides general revelation (i.e. what may be known about God from the created Universe), this sense of objective moral norms and duties also provides people with an additional witness, even if only implicit, to the existence of God.

Which hasn't accomplished much more in the world than causing Christians to disagree about abortion, gun control, mandatory minimum prison sentences, whether god wants Christians to transform the government into a Christian form of control, whether god still wants gay people to be executed, and the worst moral problem facing Christians:  the immorality of adopting heretical theology, and Christians, even those limited to the Trinitarians, constantly point the finger of heresy at each other, no need to involve the Jehovah Witnesses or Mormons.

People can have a similarly implicit rational warrant for believing that God has revealed Himself in the Bible. This is not something that you need a PhD in Biblical Studies to discover.

I fail to see the point.  The fact that all Catholics, Calvinists and KJV Onlyists believe in God does precisely nothing to dissuade them from condemning each other. 

I think for many believers they read through the Bible and encounter the cumulative force of various prophetic passages like Isaiah 53, recognizing Jesus in them.

Sorry, the "servant" was nobody living 700 years later, it was Israel itself.  Read all the passages from Isaiah 41 through 56.

They might not be able to express the argument explicitly enough to debate a learned Rabbi. But they nonetheless, I would argue, have an implicit rational warrant. Likewise, they might read through the New Testament accounts and perceive implicitly some of the hallmarks of verisimilitude, such as the criterion of embarrassment,

Yes, the NT statements that Jesus' biological family thought his miracles were purely naturalistic (Mark 3:21, 6:1-4, John 7:5) fulfill the criterion of embarrassment while staetments that Jesus did miracles do not, thereore, we have an objective basis to grant more historical weight to the skeptical position than to the believing position. 

or unexplained allusions, or undesigned coincidences.

Will God protect me from dying and going to hell while I take the next year to sort through Lydia McGrew's wordy gossipy screeds? 

They might begin to recognize the evidential value of the testimonial evidence we have in the New Testament in regard to events such as the resurrection.

Not if they previously concluded that Jesus' own family being skeptical of his miracles has more historical weight than testimony of resurrection "eyewitnesses". 

Many of those categories of evidence are actually not at all hard to grasp and may be perceived through common sense.

This is what, I suspect, many Christians in fact are talking about when they say that they just know that Christianity is true. I think often-times Christians can confuse an implicit rational warrant for belief in Scripture (which is based on evidence) with some sort of mystical inner-witness that Christianity is true. For example, one may have an inarticulate sense of the power of the whole case for Christianity without realizing that it is, in fact, a rational response to a cumulative case argument.

So, where am I going with this? I would argue that discovering evidence for God is not actually that hard. Rather, it has been made artificially hard by bad scholarship and poor standards that insist that the simplest answer cannot actually be the correct answer.

"God" is not the simplest answer.  If God is "infinite" then the "god" answer is the most complex possible answer, and must always violate Occam's Razor more than any purely naturalistic explanation. 

This is true in science as well as Biblical scholarship. A lot of the ink spilled on these issues, therefore, is ink spent answering really bad arguments that should never have gotten traction to begin with but, because they provided an excuse for unbelief, they have become widely accepted and highly esteemed, even among academics who should know better.

If academics who should know better are deceived by such reams of spilled ink, that justifies the non-academic unbeliever to disregard those reams of spilled ink, whether those reams originate with unbelievers or Christians.  I would like to know what book god wants me to read next, but how stupid would it be to seek the will of God from a person who doesn't have the first clue? 

Where is God?
A common objection to God’s existence is that, if the God of Scripture exists, then He would be reasonably expected to still be working in the world today. The skeptic reasons, then, that the failure to observe God working in a tangible and detectable way in the world today should be taken as not merely evidence against Christianity but, more than that, as a defeater of any evidence that may be offered from ancient documents.

You fallaciously presume that because the ancient documents exist, unbelievers are forced to make a decision about them one way or the other.  But that is your claim, and you cannot establish it. 

I wonder though what sort of evidence the skeptic would accept as sufficient reason to think that God is still working in the world in a tangible way.  Would it need to be a direct personal experience, or would he or she accept reliable testimony from others that they had the sort of direct personal encounter that he or she is seeking for?

Easy:  either god doing today the same miracles as recorded in the bible (there would be far less skeptics if God did for them today what God did for Saul on the road to Damascus), or, I don't need evidence because God has simply chosen to change my attitude solely by coercive telepathy (Ezra 1:1).  Apparently, apologetics is only "necessitated" because God is refusing to use his telepathic abilities to remove unbelief.  Blame it on God, he could have done better. 

Testimony, popular atheist protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, is a valid form of evidence.

But there is no rule of historiography, heremeneutics or common sense obligating anybody to give a shit about matters solely limited to 2000 year old testimony.  So when we disregard the resurrection testimony in the NT, we cannot possibly be unreasonable, as we aren't breaking any applicable rules.  

And whether testimony is "valid" evidence is not decided by you, it is decided by the authentication standards of the person who bothers to listen to the testimony.  Christians are forever disagreing amonst themselves as to just how authenticated the resurrection testimony is.  Most Christian scholars refuse the fundamentalist believe that Matthew and John are the sole creators of the canonical gospels now bearing those names.  Arguments that Mark 16 surely had an original  resurrection appearance narrative have less to do with serious evidence and more to do with speculative trifling.  Nothing in Acts indicates Paul was an eyewitness of a risen Jesus. 

When any person makes a claim to have witnessed an event, there are three – and only three – categories of explanation for that claim. Those are (a) they deliberately set out to deceive; (b) they were honestly mistaken; and (c) their claim was actually correct. I think those broad categories of explanation are mutually exhaustive (though I can imagine some situations in which they might be at work in combination). As either one of the two former claims becomes less plausible as a result of the evidence one adduces, this leads to a necessary redistribution of the probabilities, leading to option (c) becoming more probable than it was previously.

Fair enough. 

This, then, provides evidence confirming scenario (c). The greater the extent to which options (a) and (b), in any given case, are disconfirmed by the evidence, the greater support is enjoyed by option (c). This method can be applied to modern claims just as well as it can be applied to ancient ones. An individual’s track record of habitual trustworthiness and reliability can count as evidence against the hypothesis that they were deliberately setting out to deceive.

Except that you don't know the extent to which Matthew and John are responsible for the canonical text of the gospels bearing their names.  So if you notice that they never made any historical mistakes, you don't know of that trend is a result of their own honesty, or the result of very early scribes correcting the mistakes similarly to how most Christian scholars think Matthew and Luke corrected Mark.  And since dishonest deceptive people realize that surrounding their lies with nuggets of historical truth will cause most people to infer that the story "rings true", you cannot automatically deduce "honest author" from nuggets of historical truth in the gospels.  This could also be a dishonest author who includes those nuggets to make led verisimilitude to the lies. 

The plausibility of the hypothesis that they are honestly mistaken will depend on the particulars of the case.
I am not talking here about testimonies of healing that are easy to explain by some kind of sensory illusion or sleight of hand, or that plausibly would have gotten better anyway. I am talking about cases that seem to defy naturalistic explanation. Dr. Craig Keener has compiled a two volume set on claims of such miraculous occurrences.[8]

And I've already exposed what Keener wanted and didn't want to achieve in publishing that book.  See here

To take one example, he discusses a friend of his, Leo Bawa, the former director of research at Capro, a prominent Nigerian missions movement. One intriguing miracle (of several) that he told Dr. Keener about is that “among some tribes in Adamawa and Taraba State, I had instances where no interpreter was available and the Lord gave me understanding and ability to speak the people’s languages, a feat I never performed before or since after that incident.”[9] Keener notes that “Other accounts of this phenomenon exist, though many of these are secondhand”[10]. In a footnote, Dr. Keener elaborates[11],
“I have direct accounts in which others recognized the languages from Dr. Derek Morphew (Nov. 12, 2007); Pastor David Workman (Nov. 12, 2007); Pastor David Workman (April 30, 2008); Dr. Medine Moussounga Keener (Aug. 12, 2009, secondhand about Pastor Daniel Ndoundou); my student Leah Macinskas-Le (April 25, 2010, regarding her Jewish mother becoming a believer in Jesus because she understood the Hebrew prayer of an uneducated pastor’s prayer in tongues); Del Tarr, personal correspondence, Sept. 30, 2010 (noting three cases he has witnessed, including a recent one involving Korean; cf. also Oct. 5, 6, 2010).”

And all Christians who identify as Cessationist cry "foul".  And the skeptics remind you that if theological accuracy is so critically important to us avoiding eternal concious torment in an afterword, then it is not for you to decide how high their standard for evidence "should" be. THEY are taking the risk.  THEY are the only persons who can properly pontificate on how high the standard should be.  You will balk at a very high standard that would make it almost impossible for any bit of Christian evidence to be good enough, of course, but can you be too careful when the risk is as high as today's fanatics insist it is?

I have heard about this sort of phenomenon from others as well, and it does not seem to be the type of thing that could be explained naturalistically.

Keener disregarded my challenge to make his best case. 

I trust Dr. Keener and I presume that he trusts his sources since these are personal contacts of his (the fact that the phenomenon is multiply attested helps as well). So, it seems unlikely in these cases that Keener’s sources are all lying to him, and these also seem to be phenomena about which it would be quite hard to be honestly wrong.

I say they are all lies.

Now, one might object at this point that in this case the testimony is coming from someone whom they do not know personally. With public figures such as Dr. Craig Keener, though, one can, to a certain degree, evaluate whether this is someone who is likely to make stuff up.

He's a Pentecostal. He naturally seeks to justify modern day miracle claims.

This is true especially of high-profile scholars such as Dr. Keener since one can get a sense, through careful reading of their academic work, whether they are careful and reliable in their reportage of information.

Catholics are careful in their miracle reports...do you insist the bible is correct when it teaches taht God's doing a miracle through somebody means God is approving of their theology (John 10:37-38)?

You are also avoiding Deut. 13:1-5, which warns that even false prophets can do genuinely supernatural miracles.  So if we cannot deny the miraculous element of some bit of miracle testimony, how much effort should we put toward trying to figure out whether the miracle-worker is holy or unholy?  Should we cancel plans to take a child to a birthday party just so we can make more time to Google this bullshit?  The answer would seem to be "yes" if Jesus was serious in saying spiritual blessings awaited those who gave up custody of their own kids just to make more time to follow him around (Matthew 19:29). 

Dr. Michael Brown (another public figure and Biblical scholar) has also told me (on public record) about similar events to those described above, both that he was a witness to and testimonies of friends of his (including one individual, who was a cessationist and therefore not predisposed already to believe in miraculous events, who reported the incident to Dr. Brown in shock). The fact that this sort of occurrence is multiply attested by different credible sources leads me to think that something miraculous is indeed going on here.

And since it could still be from the devil, skeptics can be reasonable to just completely ignore it the way they completely refuse to personally handle very old unstable dynamite. If you can guarantee it won't blow up in our faces, we'll handle it.  Deal?  And yet you cannot make that deal.  Paul was responsible for most of the Galatian Christian converts, and yet they apparently concluded that Paul's gospel blew up in their faces because they apostatized (Galatians 1:6-9).

I chose this particular category of miracle claim as an illustrative example since this is one type of phenomenon that seems to defy naturalistic explanation and also seems to be something that it would be very difficult to be honestly wrong about having witnessed.

And since miracle claims have helped motivate people to stay within heretical beliefs like Catholicism, there is so much risk involved in investigating this bullshit that it becomes reasonable to just avoid it completely.

There are also accounts from sober-minded people whom I trust of radical experiences of the presence of God (e.g. see this one from Paul Washer).

I'm not going to consider that unless God promises to protect me from dying and going to hell for the time it takes for me to investigate Washer's claim.  Will God make that promise, and if he did, how would I know?

My question, then, to the skeptic is, as I said above, is the only type of evidence that may be admitted for God acting in the world today a direct personal encounter, or would one be prepared to accept testimonial evidence from other people?

I've already justified disregarding ancient testimony, and I've also proven that how high the evidentiary standard for miracles "should" be is nobody's call except the person who has chosen to investigate a miracle claim.  Their standard might be higher than what typical historians recommend, but the risk of being wrong about the War of Troy is far less than the risk of being wrong about Jesus.  Since you can never be too careful when the stakes are possible eternal conscious torment in the afterlife, the tougher standard is likely to be more reasonable. 

If one is only prepared to accept a direct personal encounter but not testimonial evidence, I would argue that that is not a rational approach.

How rational is the approach that says I will change my mind and obey the divine will just as soon as God foists his attitude-changing telepathy on me like he did with pagan idolater Cyrus in Ezra 1:1?  Would expecting god to use his abilities be so unreasonable? 

On the other hand, if one is willing to accept testimonial evidence that such encounters do indeed exist, then I would ask what the qualitative difference is between the testimonial evidence that is available in the present day and that which is present in the 2000 year old documents we know as the New Testament. Presumably the same principles of evaluation would pertain to those.

I've already explained the problems and risks of bothering to become involved in trying to figure out which miracle testimonies are reliable and which aren't. 

What About Unanswered Prayer?
As for unanswered prayer, this is a recurring thing that comes up in my conversations with ex-Christians – that is, that answered prayers do not seem to be distinguishable from chance and the act of prayer often feels like talking to the wall or the ceiling.

Exactly.  Nothing fails quite like prayer.  You'd achieve statistically similar results if your prayers had been directed to a barbie doll.  You ask about enough things enoug times, you are going to eventually find yourself in circumstances that "answer" that prayer.

This feeling during prayer is something I can relate to myself experientially, so it is not simply a theoretical issue for me. If Christianity is true, however, this entails that prayer is legit. Our belief in prayer should not be predicated on our evaluation of our feelings while praying or on our later examination of the result of prayer.

Which is about as stupid as saying conclusions should not be reached on the basis of an examination of the evidence.  When prayers fail, that counts. 

To do this is not to evaluate prayer in a manner consistent with what Scripture teaches us concerning prayer.

You are definitely not addressing skeptics here, so you would be irrational to expect skeptics to find your worries about staying within biblical parameters the least bit convincing. 

Nowhere in Scripture are we promised that prayer will be accompanied by an internal sense of being heard.

On the contrary, according to Mark 11:24, all prayer arising from confident trust and belief will be granted, and praying for God to give you an internal sense of being heard is certainly a reasonable prayer request, and cannot be likened to the idiot who prays for a really expensive car.

Rather, prayer is supposed to be accompanied by a conviction that our prayers are heard in Christ, since it is through Him that we have access to God.

But prayer in Mark 11:24 is about getting things, so you cannot circumnavigate around the problem of unanswered prayer by pretending that prayer is primarily about trusting in God.  

We are also not in a position to determine whether something is providentially caused by God or not.

That's probably another reason why your Calvinism is laughed at by real Calvinists like James White.  True Calvinism requires that all human choices were providentially caused by God. 

The Biblical view is not to look around for obviously miraculous causes and give God credit for those only, while presuming non-miraculous events would have happened anyway. Rather, we should view God as sovereign and credit Him with providential control over all things. So greatly has a twenty-first century naturalistic bias permeated our thinking that we in fact often fail to give God sufficient credit for His daily providence.

Then your god has providential control over all things...one example being the "thing" we call sinful human choicemaking.  The speed metal group Deicide already told you this years ago, but apparently, you need to be reminded of the obvious:  blame it on god. 

Prayer, then, should not be evaluated on the basis of a mystical sensation of being heard, or our impression of miraculous divine action in response to prayer. To do so is to judge prayer by a criterion which we were never given by God. How, then, should we evaluate the validity of prayer? We should evaluate it by the validity of the work of Christ and our faith in Him.

Then don't expect to ever notice when a failed prayer constitutes a valid reason to deny the possibility of divinely answered prayer. 

If we are trusting in Christ then we have true and valid prayer.

You are making valid prayer much more narrow than Jesus did in Mark 11.

There is more that can be said, of course, about limiting our appreciation of prayer to when God says “yes” to a request, but my point here is simply that evaluating prayer by these standards is a problem from the start. Our belief in prayer stems from our beliefs in Christ and the two should never be separated. If we believe in Christ because of the evidence for His resurrection, then we are being inconsistent to fail to believe in prayer.

Tell that to the 8 year old Christian girl whose prayers for the rapist to stop raping her go unanswered.

Another thing I will say about prayer is that there is, I think, what I would call an epistemic asymmetry when it comes to prayer. An epistemic asymmetry is where making an observation might be strong confirmatory evidence for your hypothesis but not making that observation is only weak, or even negligible, evidence against it. To take an illustration, imagine I see a spider crawling along my desk as I sit here and type this article. That would be excellent evidence for the hypothesis that, somewhere in my apartment, there is a spider. But suppose I do not see a spider in front of me. That is only very weak, even negligible evidence, that there is no spider in my apartment (since there are many other places where a spider might be). That is an example of what I call epistemic asymmetry.

We break the epistemtic asymmetry by noting that we've been challenging Christians for centuries to come up with prayer answers that more reasonably imply the divine than some naturalistic cause, and you keep coming up short.  There are billions of theists in the world.  The law of large numbers is alone sufficient to explain why, if you go looking long enough, you will find a case of prayer that was answered in a very unexpected or "lucky" way implying "god".

So, how does this relate to prayer? I would argue that specific answers to prayer are relatively strong confirmatory evidence but apparently unanswered prayer is only comparatively weak disconfirmatory evidence.

If a little Christian girl is paying or God to make the rapist stop raping her, and that prayer goes unanswered, then we return to my main point that God is irrelevant.  Normal people simply insist that rape is never justified, period, end of story. Only mentally deranged fools insist that rape can be justified is God is allowing it for the sake of a greater good.

The reason for this is that there could be many explanations for why your prayer went unanswered. Perhaps God, in his omniscience, said ‘no’ because He knows (better than you do) that what you asked for is not good for you.

Like, maybe it would be bad for the little girl if her rapist stopped raping her just as soon as she wanted him to. 

Or perhaps there is unconfessed sin in your life. Both the Old and New Testaments teach that sin can hinder our prayer life. For example, Proverbs 28:9 says, “If one turns away his ear from hearing the law, even his prayer is an abomination.”

So raise the age of the raped girl to 12, which is safely past what most consider the age of accountability.  In this case, maybe God isn't answering her prayer to make the rapist stop immediately, is because she had sinned in the past, and the punishment via rape is not yet complete. 

1 Peter 3:7 says, “Likewise, husbands, live with your wives in an understanding way, showing honor to the woman as the weaker vessel, since they are heirs with you of the grace of life, so that your prayers may not be hindered.” There could thus be any number of reasons why your prayer was not answered and it is not necessarily particularly improbable that, if Christianity is true, many of your prayers will not be answered in the way that you desired.

Leaving the raped little girl not a lot of reason to give a fuck about Jesus anymore than she gives a fuck about a mother who sometimes does and sometimes doesn't rescue her from danger. 

We have plenty of Biblical examples of prayers going unanswered. David’s prayer for the life of his illegitimate child by Bathsheba was unanswered (or answered negatively, depending on how you prefer to classify it).

And your irrational god tortured David's baby for 7 days with a very painful condition before allow it to die.  2nd Samuel 12:15-18.  Why don't you just conclude that because God is a just god, the reason he tortures babies to death is because he thinks they "deserve" it, the way he thinks they "deserve" to be born stained with original sin?  If God's ways are infinitely mysterious, can you really put it past god to place culpability where no human would dare?  If God punished Jesus despite Jesus not "deserving" it, I think your moral goose is cooked, buddy.

The same is true of Jesus’ prayer that the cup might pass from him in the Garden of Gethsemane.

Right...the second person of the Trinity requesting to avoid doing the will of the first person of the Trinity.  Matthew 26:39.  Is it sin or not sin when you know the Father's will and you still ask to be excused from it? 

In the latter example, Jesus’ prayer included the qualifier “If it is possible…” And the answer was, “No, that can’t happen.” It would probably be classified as the most spectacular unanswered prayer of all time by the atheists, except for what happens afterward with Jesus being raised from the dead.

If Jesus knew the prayer could never be granted, why did he bother making that prayer?

The answered prayers, on the other hand, depending on their level of specificity, can in principle be relatively strong confirmatory evidence for Christianity. Even if you cannot point to specific examples in your own life, there are writings by other people that would potentially document such examples (presuming them to be accurately reported). For example, George Müller (1805-1898) was a Christian evangelist and the director of the Ashley Down orphanage in Bristol, England. There was a time when the orphanage at Bristol had run out of bread and milk.[12] Müller was on his knees praying for food when a baker knocked on the door to say that he had been unable to sleep that night, and somehow knew that Müller would need bread that morning. Shortly after, a truck carrying milk broke down, directly in front of the orphanage door. There was no refrigeration. The driver begged Müller to take the milk, which would go bad if it were not consumed. It was just enough for the 300 children in the orphanage.

When you give me all the evidence pertaining to that story, I'll evaluate it for reliability.  Deal?  Or did I miss that bible verse that says the unbeliever has an obligation to investigate every answered-prayer allegation that comes down the pike? 

Conclusion

To conclude, while the problem of divine hiddenness is, on first inspection, a thorny issue, further analysis reveals it to be not as weighty a concern as it first appeared. Given the existence of plausible explanations of divine hiddenness (e.g. God’s knowledge, in His omniscience, of how different individuals will respond to the evidence of His existence), I would argue that the problem of divine hiddenness, though a complete answer eludes us, is not sufficient to overturn the extensive and varied positive confirmatory evidences of Christianity.
Dr. Jonathan McLatchie is a Christian writer, international speaker, and debater.

And he rejects scholarly politely worded challenges.  See here.

He holds a Bachelor’s degree (with Honors) in forensic biology, a Masters’s (M.Res) degree in evolutionary biology, a second Master’s degree in medical and molecular bioscience, and a Ph.D. in evolutionary biology. Currently, he is an assistant professor of biology at Sattler College in Boston, Massachusetts.

Christians believe Jesus told them everything they need to know to get saved and grow spiritually at a rate acceptable to God.  Jesus never expressed or implied that he wanted any of his followers to use any of God's time in their lives to achieve educational prominence in the study of earthly phenomena.  Think of all the preaching and discipling McLatchie could have done if he had foregone worldly pursuits and had become content to just preach and teach 'da bable.

Dr. McLatchie is a contributor to various apologetics websites and is the founder of the Apologetics Academy (Apologetics-Academy.org), a ministry that seeks to equip and train Christians to persuasively defend the faith through regular online webinars, as well as assist Christians who are wrestling with doubts. Dr. McLatchie has participated in more than thirty moderated debates around the world with representatives of atheism, Islam, and other alternative worldview perspectives. He has spoken internationally in Europe, North America, and South Africa promoting an intelligent, reflective, and evidence-based Christian faith.

That's exactly why I have high hopes for my own future public counter-apologetics tours.  If McLatchie can so eaisly miss the forest for the trees, I suspect it is because a better justification for divine hiddenness cannot be made.

Friday, December 23, 2022

My answer to email from Christian apologist Frank Turek

 I received more ads from Turek in my email, and one of them summarizes his position, so I respond in kind:

It's that time of year again! You're sitting around with family at the Christmas dinner table, and Uncle Joe insists on picking apart your Christian faith. What's the best way to respond? Ignore him while you play with your mashed potatoes? Or do you try to refute his objections?

I'd say play with the mashed potatoes, since otherwise, to engage him would be to enable him to listen to himself respond, which creates a vicious circle of self-validation.

You know you need to give the reason for the hope that you have, but how can you engage with his statements without starting a family feud? 

No, Christians of today do NOT "know" that they need to give a reason for the hope they have.  All that crap is found in the NT, and you couldn't prove that any of it applies to modern people if your life depended on it.  There are perfectly sufficient purely naturalistic explanations for the survival of the bible into modern times, otherwise, you'd have to say the Apocrypha and Dead Sea Scrolls "apply to us today".  

In this week's episode of I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, I explain that every objection to the Christian faith assumes a standard beyond the person who is making the objection.

Then you are wrong.  The criticism that god was evil in the OT arises from morality that goes no higher than the atheist's own genetic predispositions and his environmental conditioning. The only reason you succeed at this scheme of yours is because most atheists and skeptics do not have a degree in moral philosophy, and therefore are not themselves straight about why it is that a human being classifies the actions of somebody else as "evil".  Your scheme doesn't work on atheists who know what they are talking about, like me, because I correctly discern that my basis for saying the Nazis were "wrong" is not "transcendant", but goes no deeper than my own genetic predispositions and environmental conditioning.

 I also provide examples of simple questions you can ask Uncle Joe (and others like him!) to place a seed of doubt in his assertion that something is wrong with the Christian worldview. 

I promote atheism the same way.  Here's a seed of doubt for you:  Why do you automatically leap from "the NT applies to 1st-century unbelievers", over to "the NT applies to 21st century unbelievers"?  Exactly how "clear" is it that anything in the NT "applies to us today", and why shouldn't spiritually dead unbelievers balk at such a notion on the basis that even spiritually alive Christians have been ceaselessly embroiled in disagreements for 2,000 years on whether something in the NT does or doesn't "apply to us today" (i.e., Dispensationalism, Cessationism v. Charismatics, Lordship Salvation v. Easy Grace)?

What would be unreasonable about deducing from the fact of sincere persistent doctrinal disagreement among serious born again conservatives that if there is any god running the show, he doesn't give a shit that his people disagree about doctrine?  Sure, that would fuck up a few things you believe about your classical theist god, but that's the price you pay if you criticize a reasonable viewpoint held by many unbelievers.

The show addresses some of the most common objections to Christianity, including: God does immoral things in the Old Testament 

As an atheist who knows what he is talking about, as opposed to the bumbling youngsters you meet in colleges, my accusation that god did evil in the OT arises from the philosophical contention that if we don't call that god evil, then we will be forced to the absurd contention that we can no longer call pedophilia evil, NOW, we have to hedge and say "it depends on perspective: it's evil from a human perspective, but from god's perspective, maybe god knew through his ripple-effect that allowing a man to rape a child today will be necessary to make sure some yak in Ethiopia hears the gospel in the year 2805."

There's too much evil in the world 

I would never make that objection, as the book of Job makes clear that God intends all the evil in the world, because its reasonable to assume from Job that the reason bad things happen to good people is because they are mere pawns in an ego-war between God and the devil.  You need to stop assuming God cares, because otherwise this  leads to the difficulty of why a caring god would allow evil.  From Job, it is clear that God cares more about proving the devil wrong than he cares about our physical and psychological well-being.  And yet Frank Turek NEVER tells anybody Job's explanation for why god allows bad things to happen to good people. 

Christians are hypocrites and do evil things 

That doesn't prove god doesn't exist.  It only proves that God's promises of spiritual maturity to those who sincerely seek him are false, otherwise, you'd be forced to take the bigoted position that if any Christian is hypocritical in some way, this is because they aren't truly born again, or they aren't sufficiently sincere toward god.   Under that logic, you'd have to accuse Paul of lacking salvation or sincerety since he confessed to having a "thorn in the flesh".

Christianity is too exclusive 

That's a moral criticizm of fundamentalism.  And Frank Turek says everybody gets their moral sense from god, so, what would be unreasonable in saying "Christianity is too exlcusive" seems true to a lot of people because that is precisely what god is telling them?

God doesn't show himself enough 

The more refined version of the argument is that if God had anywhere near the level of concern to save me as is manifested by fundamentalist evangelists, he would NOT stay "hidden" behind this "bible is historically reliable" dogshit anymore than he would have stayed silent toward Saul and expected that Pharisaic fool to recognize the need to exegete the OT in Christ-o-centric fashion.  You have your "god's ways are mysterious" trifle, but your error is in assuming that because that excuse makes YOU reasonable, it must create the logical consequence of causing those who disagree with you to become unreasonable.  Reasonableness doesn't work the way accuracy does, therefore reasonableness for you doesn't dictate the limits of reasonableness for somebody else...especially if we move beyond banal modern daily life into esoteric bullshit like 3,000 year old theology.  Otherwise, you could just as easily characterize the Christians who doctrinally differ from you as being "unreasonable", and there you go:  you become a bigot again, and the way your brain fizzes dictates what reality says to the brains of other people.  You either become a bigot, or it can possibly be reasonable to disagree with your views about theology.

The Bible doesn't recognize LGBTQ+ rights

because when the bible books were being formed, maintaining family was paramount...and that could never have been done if half the Jews were gay.  In the ancient world, gay means to disappear from the gene-pool, thus apparently nature has determined that gay is no good.  The fact that modern technology enables gays to thwart nature without nature's effects (to always avoid heterosexual intercourse is to disappear from the genepool) no more justifies fags than would the argument that says modern technology enables pedophiles to thwart nature without experiencing nature's intended effects (the adults in the village seeking to kill him).  Gays need to learn:  we can tell what would count as "defect" in the human population.  Since heterosexuality is and always has been normative, gay becomes the defect no less than does the hermaphrodite.  My own opinion is that modern society would have a lot less sexual sin if it never created ways to thwart nature.  If you always see naked women from childhood, you tend not to lust, and ancient American indians were noted by white explorers for lacking lust.  If we never enabled birth control, we'd refrain from sexual intercourse unless we intended to produce children.  Modern society's clever ways at helping people avoid the consequences that naturally came with sexual activity is precisely why most people think it is ok to constantly lust and constantly use sex to sell ads.

There's no evidence for God ​ 

that's true, but I prefer to instead ask how "god" could possibly matter, given that no Christian apologist has any better than a snowball's chance in hell of showing that something in the bible "applies to us today".  Thus, denying the 'truth' about god appears to be about as unacceptably dangerous as denying the existence of a jelly-stain in a landfill.  God's existence cannot be argued to be a danger to those who knowingly reject the true gospel, so why should anybody worry that denying god is to deny truth, any more than they would worry that denying the existence of frozen methane on Pluto is to deny truth?  If denial of a truth cannot be shown to make the least bit of difference, why should the denier care?  Bigoted idiot apologists will say "because smart people care about truth", but it could just as easily be argued that it is only a stupid person who decides to believe the "gospel", join some "church", and therefore invite into their lives a shitload of extra bickering that they don't really need.  The person who never gets married thinks missing out on "love" is better than to have loved and lost.  The person who never bothers believing in "god" thinks missing out on such an esoteric controversial thing is better than getting caught up in heresies, church splits, apologetics disputes and moralizing crap that always seems to accompany conversion to theism.

PLUS— Hear testimonies from three people whose lives have been transformed by the Holy Spirit through the work we do here at Cross Examined!

Then go to the nearest Mormon church to hear the same thing!

Then go to the nearest JW church to hear the same thing!

Then go to the nearest KJV Only church to hear the same thing!

Then go to the nearest Cessationist church to hear the same thing!

Then go to the nearest Pentecostal church to hear the same thing!

Then go to the nearest Calvinist church to hear the same thing!

Then go to the nearest Catholic church to hear the same thing!

As you listen to these amazing stories, we hope you will prayerfully consider donating to the ministry so we can effectively reach even more people with the truth in 2023.

Because as we all know, the Holy Spirit never activates unless people give their money.

Tuesday, October 11, 2022

My Second Reply to Jonathan McLatchie on ECREE

This is my reply to an article by Jonathan McLatchie entitled


A popular slogan among many contemporary atheists is that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”. The slogan itself goes back to the late astronomer Carl Sagan [1], though similar ideas were expressed by David Hume, who wrote “that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.” [2] Indeed, so confident was David Hume about this principle that he said, humble man that he was, “I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument…which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures.” [3]

So far, so good. 

This principle has led many skeptics to push the bar of demonstration so unreasonably high that it cannot possibly be cleared by any amount of testimonial evidence. And atheists seldom attempt to define what precisely is meant by “extraordinary”, or what sort of evidence would be sufficient to demonstrate an extraordinary event. As such, it has become a lazy excuse of many atheists for not dealing with the evidence for miraculous events such as the resurrection, but instead to dismiss it by appeal to Sagan’s dictum or to David Hume’s treatise against miracles (which the skeptic has seldom read for himself).

That's true to a large extent, but the reader should remember that when you refute the lazy incorrect atheist for their employment of ECREE, you are NOT refuting the intellectually superior atheists, like me, who have responsibly and fairly defined ECREE.  Your winning a debate against a lazy atheist is akin to me winning a debate against a snake-handling Pentecostal.  Gee, is that progress or what?

In this article, I will argue that the dictum that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and the philosophy of David Hume that it encapsulates, are fundamentally wrong-headed.

Fallacy of guilty by association.  First, lazy atheists are not authoritative sources for fair definitions of ECREE.  Second, you condemn yourself by accusing ECREE of being wrong-headed, since you employ it against every miracle claim you evaluate.  But the reason you overlooked that was because you chose to base ECREE in how lazy atheists define it.  When it is defined fairly and objectively, it merely described how most people, including Christians react to extraordinary news the first time they hear it. 

Signs and the Order of Nature
What is the stated purpose of miracles in religious contexts? According to Scripture, miracles function as signs that authenticate the message of the person performing them.

Do you seriously expect the atheist or skeptic to respect a 'scriptural' description of the purpose of a miracle?  By appeal to "scripture", a smart guy like you surely realizes he is no longer foisting an intellectual obligation on skeptics, he is merely preaching to the choir. 

For example, when Jesus is asked by disciples of John the Baptist whether He is the Messiah, or whether they should be waiting for another, Jesus replies, “Go and tell John what you hear and see: the blind receive their sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have good news preached to them. And blessed is the one who is not offended by me,” (Mt 11:4-6). In other words, Jesus’ miracles were signs that authenticated His message.

If the signs are intended to authenticate the message, then why shouldn't we infer from your belief that some Roman Catholic miracle claims are true, that that Roman Catholic message (i.e., Catholic theology) is true?  And yet the bible is not consistent about the purpose of miracles, because in Deuteronomy 13:1-5 God admits that if a false prophet does a genuinely supernatural miracle, this is not to confirm his theology, this is God using the false prophet to "test Israel". 

The gospel of John refers to Jesus’ miracles as “signs.”

Correct.  And it also blindly leaps from Jesus performing a sign, to Jesus being the true messiah.  John was apparently blind to the grim possibility that God will enable a false prophet's predictions to come true in a supernatural way because God is testing Israel. 

Towards the conclusion of his gospel, John writes, “Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of the disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written so that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life in his name,” (Jn 20:30-31).
If the purpose of miracles in religious contexts, therefore, is to function as signs, then they have to take place against the backdrop of a stable, uniform, natural order, since it is by contrast with a stable, uniform, natural order that miracles are able to serve as signs.

Fair enough. 

Consider, for instance, the relevance of the abnormal character of the resurrection to the epistemic value of Jesus being raised from the dead. If people were routinely rising from the dead then the resurrection of Jesus would lose its epistemic value, since it would not be an event that could be distinguished from the way that nature normally operates. It is precisely because it is unique, and is an interruption of the regularities of nature that we can appeal to the resurrection as God’s vindication of the claims of Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah and Savior of the world.

It doesn't matter if that is true, you are still leaping too quickly from "Jesus performed a genuinely supernatural miracle" over to "surely God approved of Jesus' theology", and in doing so you defy Deuteronomy 13:1-5.  You also defy plenty of other bible passages indicating God allows the devil to perform genuinely supernatural feats for the purpose of deception.   

Thus, since miraculous signs require that there be a stable natural order, the existence of such a stable natural order cannot be taken as an argument against the occurrence of miracles in religious contexts.

Then you'll be having lots of trouble with me.  I'm not one of those skeptics who blindly follow Hume into his "miracles are impossible" errors.  I allow for the possibility of miracles.  The way I stab apologetics in the heart is by asking the apologist to produce the one miracle claim they feel is most impervious to a naturalistic interpretation.  I issued that challenge to Craig Keener years ago, and for reasons that should be clear from my challenge, he did not dare respond.  See here.

This point was first raised in response to David Hume by William Adams, who wrote that “An experienced uniformity in the course of nature hath always thought necessary to the belief and use of miracles. These are indeed relative ideas. There must be an ordinary regular course of nature, before there can be any thing extraordinary. A river must flow, before its stream can be interrupted.” [4] Philosopher Dr. Tim McGrew, of Western Michigan University, concurs: “The fact that in our ordinary experience dead men stay dead

Apparently Dr. McGrew has fallen into Humes error too:  How does McGrew know that dead people staying dead is the "ordinary experience" of other people?  Isn't that equally as fallacious as the atheist view that says nobody else has experienced a miracle?

cannot be a significant piece of evidence against the resurrection considered as a miraculous sign — that is, it will not do the work that Hume wants it to do in the very sort of religious context where he is most implacably skeptical.” [5]
Can Testimony Ever Be Sufficient to Establish a Miracle?

Not if a) the bible has god warning people of divine wrath against heresy, and b) the unbeliever in question is so worried about imperfect people leading her into heresy and thus into hell that she refuses to allow any imperfect person to guide her thinking about biblical miracle claims.  What are you gonna do now?  Chortle that she "should" be willing to increase the risk of heresy by allowing imperfect and possibly heretical Christians to influence how she processes miracle claims?  Until the day you show that biblical warnings of divine wrath against heresy are god's way of "just kidding", you cannot fault this unbeliever for noticing that most hell-bound heresy has come from imperfect Christians, and choosing to exclude imperfect people from those whom she will allow to teach her about "truth".

It may be admitted that miraculous events do require more evidence to establish them than do mundane events, since the prior probability (that is, their probability given the background information) is lower than for mundane events. I shall return later to why miraculous claims are rightly treated differently from mundane ones. However, I shall note here that any proposition with a non-zero prior probability can, in principle, be demonstrated with sufficient evidence. The eighteenth century British Bishop Thomas Sherlock wrote concerning the resurrection, “I do allow that this case, and others of like nature, require more evidence to give them credit than ordinary cases do. You may therefore require more evidence in these than in other cases; but it is absurd to say that such cases admit no evidence, when the things in question are quite manifestly objects of sense.” [6]

What you aren't telling the reader is why there are apparently no rules of historiography, evidence, hermeneutics or common sense that enable two equally mature educated adults to resolve their disagreement on which evidence to credit and which to disregard.  The truth is that no such rules exist.  If a skeptic says his standard of evidence for Jesus' resurrection-miracle is a personal vision straight from god, you could not possibly get near "showing" that his standard of evidence for theological claims is "too high".  It is only rational for him to fear the bible-god's thunderings against Christians who teach heresy, and to therefore take extreme measures to ensure he doesn't end up in eternal misery, or that nasty surprise Jesus said would be endured in judgment by those who in this world called Jesus "Lord, Lord."  Matthew 7:22-23.   Of course, there is no god, spirit, devil or supernatural.  But so long as you insist on using the bible, you become sandbagged by the bible's unrealistically conspiratorial views.  If things really are as bad and deceptive as the bible says, you can hardly blame anybody for refusing to trust imperfect sinners on critical theological matters which allegedly have potential to land a person in eternal misery.

In 2000, philosopher John Earman, himself a religious agnostic, published a book by the provocative title Hume’s Abject Failure — The Argument Against Miracles. [7] Earman cites the nineteenth century philosopher and mathematician Charles Babbage, who wrote that “if independent witnesses can be found, who speak the truth more frequently than falsehood, it is ALWAYS possible to assign a number of independent witnesses, the improbability of the falsehood of whose concurring testimonies shall be greater than that of the improbability of the miracle itself,” [8]

What he didn't account for is that liars who want their lie to successfully deceive others, have just as much interest as honest authors in surrounding their main contentions with nuggets of historical truth.  YOU will say if the parts of the author's testimony that can be checked turn out to be true, we should trust the parts of his testimony that cannot be checked.  But I would more objectively insist that if the parts of the witnesses testimony that can be checked turn out to be true, that's not enough for us to decide whether he is including truthful details because he is generally honest, or if he is including truthful details to make his lie "ring true".

What do you suppose would happen to the American justice system if it adopted a new pattern jury instruction saying "If you find that the parts of the criminal Defendant's testimony that can be checked turn out to be true, you should believe as true also the parts of his or her testimony that cannot be checked"? 

Thus, Hume’s so-called “everlasting check” fails, since a cumulative case can, in principle, be adequate to overcome the intrinsic improbability of a miracle, thereby being sufficient to warrant belief.

It doesn't matter if that is true, "sufficient to warrant belief" does not automatically necessitate "sufficient to condemn unbelief".  And in my brand of skepticism, I don't say belief in Jesus' resurrection is unwarranted.  I say instead that rejecting the resurrection testimony is warranted.  Contrary to popular belief, your personal opinion on when evidence reaches a minimal state of quality/quantity so as to justify trust, does not impose any obligation upon another person to change their evidentiary standards and suddenly start agreeing with you on what evidence seems to be the most convincing. 

Typically, when an atheist states that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”, they have in mind a single spectacular piece of evidence that is sufficient to overcome the intrinsic improbability of the miracle itself. However, what can be accomplished by a single spectacular piece of evidence can, in principle, also be achieved by numerous pieces of less spectacular evidence, perhaps none of which individually is of particularly great weight but collectively is equivalent in weight to a single piece of spectacular evidence.

And what if the identity of the witnesses was equally as disputed among the common people as often as Christian scholars disagree with each other on the identities of the gospel authors?  Or did I inspire you, just now, to write a book entitled "How To Know Whether An Unidentifiable Witness Is Telling the Truth?

Your chosen word "overcome"  falsifies your entire spiel:  you speak as if what one should ultimately do with a given piece of evidence is governed by some established rule of evidence or historiography, meaning you think it can be made clear when a person's choice to disregard some bit of evidence has "violated" any such rule.  Such a rule doesn't exist.  Again, it's why equally educated adult jurors often become deadlocked, and disagree on which evidence should be credited or disregarded.  No, a deadlock does not necessarily mean one of the jurors is being unreasonable.  If you know of any rule that will enable reasonable people to agree on whether to credit or disregard some bit of testimony, why don't you notify the American Court system, so judges can incorporate it into their Rules of Evidence, and you rid the world of deadlocked juries forever?

The Cambridge philosopher Arif Ahmed, himself an outspoken atheist, has sought to meet the challenge of Earman and Babbage to Hume by arguing that the presumption of independence is often false. [9] For example, in the case of a stage illusion or trick, given that at least one person has been fooled, the probability that many other people will be fooled as well is significantly increased. Thus, successive pieces of evidence fail to add significant force to the case that a true miracle was observed. Tim McGrew responds to this point by noting that “The cumulative testimonial evidence might have a theoretical limit to its force, but it might not. Without further information about the specific case in question, we cannot say anything more. Everything depends on the details,” [10]. McGrew further observes concerning the claimed resurrection of Jesus, “The witnesses are not all confined to one vantage point, as they were in the case of the stage magician.

Does that help or hinder the case for Jesus, who often did "miracles" for "large crowds" (i.e., people who were confined to a single vantage point)?

Regardless, the NT often says resurrection witnesses were confined to a single vantage point.  Matthew 28:16-17, Luke 24:31, 37, John 20:20, 26, 30, 21:5, 1st Cor. 15:6. 

If they agree, it is much more difficult to find a single simple explanation for how they could all have been fooled.

Wow, I didn't know that you found it difficult to find a single explanation for how the attendees of a Benny Hinn Crusade could have all been fooled.   The same with large groups being fooled by Peter Popoff and other faith-healers.

Their testimonies are not bare assertions that the event in question happened.

You are assuming it was a plural "they" who gave the testimony we read today.  Not at all.  Generously assuming for the sake of argument the NT provides 20 separate resurrection eyewitness reports, that still leaves 480 others (1st Cor. 15:6) whose testimony we don't have.  Worse, Luke apparently didn't find that any preaching activity of the 82 apostles (12 + 70) was important enough to significantly document the way he does for Paul.  We are going to be reasonable, despite possible trifles otherwise, to conclude that the reason we have nearly nothing from biblical history about the vast majority of the original witnesses is because they didn't do anything indicating they experienced a radical transformation. 

They may include details that interlock with details in other testimonies in ways that increase their credibility.” [11]
The Problem of Defining “Extraordinary”
Tim McGrew has dubbed this slogan that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” the Argumentum Sagani in honor of Carl Sagan [12]. In his presentations on the subject, he parodies the argument as follows (though he notes that this parody is not original with him):

1. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

2. The claim that a miracle has occurred is extraordinary.

Therefore,

3. Any evidence supporting it ought to be extraordinary as well.

4. I am not sure what I mean by “extraordinary.”

5. But whatever you come up with, it’s not going to work.

Therefore,

6. No one is justified in believing any miracle claim.

The problem with the word “extraordinary” here is that it is rarely clearly defined.

Which means the problems for you start when you encounter an intellectually superior atheist who DOES clearly define ECREE.  To fairly and objectively define the "extraordinary" just take the phrase at issue:

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence

and replace "extraordinary" with its dictionary definition (I use Merrian-Webster), and we get:

Claims which go beyond what is usual, regular, or customary, or are exceptional to a very marked extent, require evidence which goes beyond what is usual, regular, or customary, or else is exceptional to a very marked extent.

Yes, what constitutes "beyond the usual" or "beyond the customary" involves inevitable subjectivity, but that only bolsters the skeptic's case, since the subjectivity, being necessary, cannot possibly be overcome, and presto, we land right back in typical daily reality...where equally educated adults often reach a point where their disagreement on what to do with a piece of evidence, is not governed by any "rule".  Therefore, what the skeptic is doing with the evidence cannot "violate" any such rule, and therefore, any accusation that what the skeptic did with the evidence was "unreasonable" cannot be objectively grounded.  It bears repeating:  You apologists constantly pretend as if a careful application of the rules of historiography would bring to light which assessment of the evidence is "most probable" and which assessment is "less probable", when in fact no historian on the face of the earth will tell you the rules of historiography are capable of resolving disputes between laypeople anymore than such rules are capable of resolving disputes between historians.   

The mantra that I would adopt instead is that all claims require sufficient evidence.  What counts as sufficient evidence will depend upon the relevant prior probability.

Which doesn't mean much since historians, Christians and philosophers disagree with each other constantly on whether some bit of evidence is "sufficient" rendering reasonable the reader who concludes that at the end of the day, such disputes are much ado about nothing, otherwise, the experts would not maintain disagreement for so long.  Lots of smart people know Bayesian probability theory, yet they also disagree with each other about what degree of probability such calculus yields for Jesus' resurrection. 

And, indeed, the only relevance that the fact that a given event is supernatural has epistemically is that it suppresses the prior. However, even prior probabilities that are extremely small (but non-zero) can, in principle, be overcome if adequate evidence is forthcoming.

I can grant that for the sake of argument, but that will never help you, as no such evidence has ever been "adequate", probably because, again, the rules of historiography are not nuanced enough to justify pretending that they can reveal which hypothesis has greater probability, at least not in situations where the evidence is both ancient and ambiguous and sourced in authors of disputed identities.

This failure on the part of atheists to define what they mean by “extraordinary” in this context leads to them setting the bar of evidence so unreasonably high that the burden of proof cannot possibly be met.

So quit playing in the sandbox and get out here in the trenches, where the atheists fairly define ECREE.

What is the problem with the word “extraordinary”?

Nothing, once it is replaced by its dictionary definition. 

If by that word we simply mean an event that is highly improbable or unique, then any event can be defined with sufficient specificity to meet that criteria. For example, consider Joe’s marriage to Sally. Joe being married to someone with the specific traits and characteristics of Sally is enormously improbable — especially when one considers the numerous other couples who had to meet, and the specific sperm cells that had to meet specific egg cells, all the way back to the dawn of humanity, in order for Joe and Sally to both be living at the same time. And yet Joe would be able to offer sufficient evidence that he is in fact married to Sally – adequate evidence to overcome a low prior probability.

That's nothing new.  I already admit that ECREE includes subjective elements.  One them is the point at which a person "should" classify a claim as "extraordinary".  Your problem is not with the atheist but with ECREE being a mere rule of thumb and thus offering something less than absolute certainty. 

Is the fact that Joe married Sally an extraordinary event? Well, it depends on what you mean by “extraordinary.”

Exactly.  I don't find two particular people getting married to each other to be "extraordinary" because under that logic, every interaction of persons and objects would qualify as extraordinary, and if we are to have a sensible disussion, we have to come to terms on what kinds of events are non-extraordinary.

The point I am trying to make here is that you cannot simply define an extraordinary event as an occurrence that is highly improbable or unique (i.e. that it is something that lies outside of what normally happens), since that takes us into the realm where we can show that lots of events are very improbable or unique, if they are defined with enough specificity.

That's not a flaw in ECREE, that merely ECREE's unavoidable subjectivity.

Instead, the argument here is going to need to be more sophisticated. So, let me try to steel man the atheist’s argument and formalize why we tend to treat the resurrection differently from how we would treat the case of Joe marrying Sally.

Your geekiness is blinding me.  We treat Jesus resurrection differently from daily marriages for the same reason we treat alien abduction stories differently from claims about heavy traffic.

Why Do We Treat a Miracle Claim as Different from a Mundane Claim?
Why, then, do we treat a miracle claim, like “Jesus rose from the dead”, differently from how we might treat a more mundane claim, like “Joe married Sally”?

Because we rightly fear that if we start believing Jesus rose from the dead, we may end up in a "cult" promoting "heresy", and we are aware that the bible-god strongly condemns heretics.  Once again, unles  you claim those parts of the bible are "just kidding" you cannot blame an unbeliever for taking exteme measures to make sure she doesn't make her eternal resting place more miserable than it needs to be.  One such measure is consistent with the NT;  not letting anybody teach her anything about the NT except the Christian teacher who possesses the same level of infallibility as the original apostles allegedly did after Acts 2.  Sure, you will balk because you know you cannot satisfy that high standard.  But inability to meet the standard doesn't mean the standard is too high.  It may just as easily imply that your evidence is insufficient to demonstrate which viewpoint is most reasonable. 

Clearly, it is not that the former is more improbable than the latter, or that the former is a very unique or an unprecedented event, since mundane claims, like “Joe married Sally”, can be defined with enough specificity to make them highly improbable, unique and unprecedented events as well. Obviously, the very same problem would be encountered if Joe had married any other woman, and so this consideration may be ‘cancelled out’. This is equally true of a lottery. The lottery being won by any given individual is extremely improbable. But since this is equally true of all participants in the lottery, we can ‘cancel’ that consideration. On the other hand, suppose that someone wins the lottery who happens to be the spouse or son or a close friend of the person running the lottery. In that case, we get more suspicious because that can be thought of as more probable on an alternative hypothesis than that of chance coincidence. Notice here that we do not get suspicious simply because something extremely improbable has happened — because this individual winning the lottery is no more improbable than any other individual selected at random winning it. Rather, we get suspicious because we consider that this particular individual winning the lottery is more expected (more probable) if something suspicious has happened than it is on the hypothesis of chance.

What you carefully avoided saying was "we get suspicious because for a relative of a Lottery-office worker to win the Lottery increases the likelihood that there was collusion."  But you didn't want to say that because you think Matthew and John were close with Jesus, and your logic could then be used by a skeptic to justify the theory that these close associates, like Benny Hinn and his body guards, agreed to deceive others.  

This is a good parallel for how the skeptic thinks about a miracle report such as the claim that Jesus was raised from the dead.

No it isn't.  We can easily verify that others have won lotteries.  We have never verified that anybody ever rose from the dead.  The problem of improbability in jesus rising from the dead is orders of magnitude larger than the problem of improbability of somebody somewhere winning a lottery.

Just like the hypothesis of fraud picks out the lottery example for special suspicion, so in this case, the skeptic argues, the hypothesis of hallucination or deceit picks out the resurrection reports for special suspicion.

Put me down for "vision later embellished into physical sightings of a bodily risen Jesus". 

But note that this is not based on a purely inductive approach that argues that the event of the resurrection or of the suspicious lottery win is improbable by itself (because of the problem I raised above). Instead, the argument ought to be something to the effect that in the past we have found such claims to be more explicable by way of alternative hypotheses, so most likely this one is too. This then moves us into a discussion of alternative explanations of the evidence under consideration and whether those explanations are reasonable.

Correct, except that by the word "moves" you fallaciously assume that upon arriving at that point, the skeptic is under some type of compulsion to provide the alternative theory or admit unreasonableness.  He isn't.  I can be reasonable to deny the hypothesis that space aliens created the Bermuda Triangle, even if I don't know how to explain the allegation that ships and planes disappear in that area than in any other.

Further Problems With Inductive Assessments of the Prior Probability of Miracles
Another point that is worth bearing in mind is that it, if the prior probability of miraculous events is judged in purely inductive terms, Christians and skeptics are likely going to disagree about the priors anyway. The atheist presumably would take every miraculous report from the Old and New Testaments as another example of a failed miracle report, adding it to his case against miracles, whereas the Christian beliefs that those miracles in fact took place. Thus, simply putting the resurrection into the reference class of “alleged miracles” and then asking for a purely inductive prior probability of its occurrence is quite unhelpful. In fact, the atheist’s attribution of those miracle accounts to naturalistic causes is itself in significant measure a consequence of his non-empirical metaphysical judgments.

Should I believe god is protecting me, while I write this, from going to hell?  If not, what would God rather have me do, and does the NT support the modern Christian desire to engage in scholarly questions of sources and methodology?  Or are you slightly worreid that the detailed trifling detailed way modern day apologists obey Jude 3 was never intended by the NT authors?  When you read the NT, do you come away with the feeling that God wants unbelievers to purchase apologetics books and comprehensively examine the arguments therein?  No, you don't.

It is hardly as though there are millions upon millions of other cases where a miracle was reported and the skeptic, having thoroughly investigated each claim, has found compelling empirical evidence for their falsity. This is why the appeal of David Hume to the uniform testimony of mankind against miracles is wrong-headed.

It's also wrongheaded to go chasing after a miracle-claim that has a demonstrable history of enticing the investigators into adopting a heretical form of Christianity. 

Indeed, there are many miracle reports in existence. Craig Keener has documented many examples in his two volume set on miracles [13].

He has also refused my challenge to give me the evidence for the one he thinks most impervious to falsification. 

Thus, as far as that is concerned, Hume is simply wrong. Human experience is not at all uniform on this matter.

Now YOU are making the same mistake.  You don't know that human experience "is not at all uniform on this matter".  All you know is that many people claim miracle-experiences.  Which of them are being truthful, deceptive or mistaken, you really can't say. 

And you neglect to mention the benefits of miracle apathy:  how many Christian churches, which you think are "heretical", did an unbeliever safely steer clear of, by not caring about Jesus' resurrection?  Is it morally good or morally bad when an unbeliever refuses to attend a heretical church?

You will likely respond "but look at the benefits the unbeliever lost by being disinterested in miracles!"

Unfortunately for you, you will never be demonstrating that theological benefits, because the Christian churches disagree with each other on what the relevant NT passages mean.  The only "benefit" to miracle-investigation is you might end up adopting certain beliefs that open the door for for you to join some church, which in this world is a source of social stability.  

In fact, Hume’s whole argument here is circular, since in order to argue that the uniform experience of man precludes miraculous events, he has to dismiss the numerous reports of such miracles as false – the very point he is endeavoring to establish.

No, he only has to show that his belief that they are false, is reasonable.  He doesn't have to show that they are actually false.  No historian would say that claims based on nothing but testimony can be positively falsified by outsiders.  When we assert some miracle claim is false, that's a probability judgment, not an absolute claim.

In the case of the resurrection of Jesus, what is the relevant background information, which will inform our assessment of the prior probability?

How many times have you seen the tooth-fairy leave money under somebody's pillow?  If never, does that establish a prior probability?

We have strong independent reason to think God exists

No, the strongest rebuttals to theism are a) the arguments that god-talk is ultimately meaningless, b) godtalk is essentially ad hoc by necessity, and c) there is no "rule" requiring people to "care" about higher authorities who have a consistent track record of refusing to respond to their most devoted followers.

and that He sometimes performs miracles.

So provide me all the evidence in favor of the one miracle you think most clearly resists all purely naturalistic interpretations, and lets get started.

However, God doesn’t appear to perform those miracles particularly frequently, so they do fall into a reference class that is rather special on the basis of considerations such as God’s wanting to reserve them for special occasions so that they can be recognized as a sign against the background of a regular natural order.

And here you completely forget that your bible says god may sometimes do a real miracle at the hands of a false prophet merely to "test Israel".  Does Deuteronomy 13 "apply to us today"?  what dispensationalism materials does god want me to study, and how long will he expect me to study before he expects me to correctly discern which camp is right about how the OT "applies to us today"?  If you don't know, you forfeit the right to balk if I answer that question for myself in a way you don't like.  If then I decide God will give me 25 years to study that convoluted mess of theological nothingness call "dispensationalism", you are deprived of any justification for screaming "behold now is the day of salvation!". I can thus justify rejecting the gospel for the next 25 years.  

However, this implies a much higher prior than the prior assigned by the skeptic, even before we factor in other considerations that could raise the prior probability in Jesus’ particular case. It is to these other considerations that I now turn.
The Relevance of Religio-Historical Context to Estimating the Prior
For the reasons expressed above, I think that a purely inductive or frequentist approach to estimating the prior probability of the resurrection of Jesus is mistaken.

Why? What "rule" does the frequentist violate?   

The prior probability, I would suggest, can instead be raised by (a) pointing to the independent evidence from natural theology that God exists (if there is independent demonstration that there is a God who could perform the miracle, then this increases the prior probability of Him actually performing a miracle at least somewhat);

Fat chance.  godtalk is meaingless and is the most extreme example of the ad hoc fallacy.

and (b) fleshing out, to borrow a phrase from William Lane Craig, the religio-historical context of the resurrection.

So in the religio-historical context of modern Roman Catholic miracles, the miracles operate as they did for Jesus in the first-century:  They do not merely prove the supernatural realm exists, they also "confirm the message".  You will balk like crazy because you know you'll lose hard if you simply agree that genuinely supernatural miracles among Catholics today is divine conformation that their theology is approved by God.  But from a purely objective standpoint, I don't think you can convincingly argue that God intends modern-day miracles to do anything less than what you think 1st century miracles were supposed to do:  "confirm the message".

By elaborating this religio-historical context, one can show that God plausibly might have motivation for raising Jesus of Nazareth specifically from the dead.

But Jesus' family didn't think his miracles were real (Mark 3:21, 6:1-4, John 7:5), which argues that the miracles likely weren't real, which suggests God would not raise Jesus from the dead, because God would not want to premise His second covenant upon the words and works of somebody incapable of doing miracles. 

William Lane Craig notes, “A miracle without a context is inherently ambiguous.

That doesn't mean God wouldn't do a miracle outside of a context.  Maybe god operates in a way that creates intolerable ambiguities for Christian apologists. 

But if a purported miracle occurs in a significant religio-historical context, then the chances of its being a genuine miracle are increased.

But only if you assume God is the sort of God who cares about establishing a religio-historical context.

And under your reasoning as adopted from W.L.Craig, supra, the medieval Christian miracle stories are flooded with religio-historical context, therefore the chances of those being genuine miracles are increased.  So, Mr. McLatchie, how many medieval Christian miracle stories do you believe are true? 

For example, if the miracles occur at a momentous time (say, a man’s leprosy vanishing when Jesus speaks the words, ‘Be clean!’) and do not recur regularly in history, and if the miracles are numerous and various, then the chances of their being the result of some unknown natural causes are reduced. In Jesus’ case, moreover, his miracles and resurrection ostensibly took place in the context of and as the climax to his own unparalleled life and teachings and produced so profound an effect on his followers that they worshiped him as Lord.” [14]

Now you are preaching to the choir with your presupposition that such gospel details are true, when in fact there are objective justifications to hold that the gospels at best are mere legends and embellishments around several nuggets of historical truth.  If in this article I don't supply examples, it is because the greater purpose is to provide point-to-point rebuttal.  How much or how little I "should" support my own claims in this context is nobody's preorgative but mine.  Otherwise, I'd have to write 90,000 pages of detail to make sure I satisfy all internet fuckups who think god imparted to them the spiritual gift of nitpicking.

How can this religio-historical context be elaborated in an objective way?

You will never show that unbelievers ever "should" care. 

I would point here to instances in the gospels of what I call Messianic convergence. That is, instances in the gospel accounts where an episode in Jesus’ life intersects in some striking way with the Old Testament Scriptures but which also enjoys strong historical support. This is best explained by giving examples, so I will give a few here.
The evidence is compelling that Jesus died on the Day of Passover, the 15th of Nisan. I won’t get into the details here of how we know the gospels are historically reliable on this detail, since I only wish to illustrate the principle. Given the theological theme in the New Testament of Jesus being the fulfillment of the Passover lamb (e.g. 1 Cor 5:7), this is quite striking. This is not by any means a conclusive proof that Christianity is true, but that striking correspondence does seem to be somewhat more probable on the hypothesis that Christianity is true than on the falsehood of that hypothesis, and may therefore be counted as evidence (not proof) that Jesus is indeed the Messiah. I suggest that a Bayes factor of 10 (meaning it is 10 times more likely on the hypothesis of Christianity than on its falsehood), though admittedly somewhat subjective, is a fairly conservative estimate.

But you don't know whether the gospels are reportng the date of Jesus' death accurately, and other Christian apologists like Mike Licona are apparently convinced that the gospel authors felt free to narrate facts in a manner other than as they actually happened.  Sorry, but if it be reasonable to date the gospels roughly around 70 a.d., that gives their authors 35 years to contemplate the theological implications of Jesus' death, and the temptation to portray Jesus falsely as if he knew he was supposed to die, must have been irresistible for gospel authors who think Jesus is this wonderfully exalted being.

This argument may be developed as a cumulative case. In previous articles (e.g. here), I have discussed the undesigned coincidence that corroborates John’s statement that Jesus entered Jerusalem five days before Passover, on the week leading up to His death, which would correspond to the 10th day of the month of Nisan (Jn 12:12).

Why would it matter if it was a historical fact? Even assuming Christianity is true, that does nothing to smooth over the real world experience of many Christians that God seems to be so apathetic that they have trouble distinguishing him from a non-existent god.  An intelligent mammal is always stupid to just keep pestering some  higher-order being after it becomes clear that the higher-order being is either not home, or is not interested.  Yes, there comes a point when "God's delays are not God's denials" has worn too thin and has lost its force.  But to answer more directly, a skeptic could be just as reasonable as you, to explain this as Jesus recognizing at some point he would be executed, and so he engaged in actions that he thought consistent with his interpretation of OT passages he viewed as messianic.  Then the gospel authors came along later and realized the benefit of subtlety:  stories that have Jesus exactly mirroring messianic expectations would appear equally as transparently fabricated as stories about how the child Jesus manifested both childish and divine traits, but stories that have Jesus "fulfilling" some messianic expectation more indirectly would be slightly more believable.  And let's not forget that Jesus was also a mystic, which explains why there is so much fortune cookie bullshit to gospel theology.

It turns out that the instructions given in Exodus 12 regarding the Passover stipulated that on the 10th of Nisan the Jews were to select their Passover lamb and bring it into their homes (verse 3). Isn’t it striking, then, that Jesus’ death on the Day of Passover just so happened to be the same year that Jesus entered Jerusalem on the 10th day of Nisan?

No, the gospel authors are simply employing fiction to do what they do best, and make Jesus appear to be a fulfillment of several OT themes.

Now, we need to be careful here since it may be pointed out that this coincidence is not wholly independent of the previous one, since Jesus coming into Jerusalem on Nisan 10 would not matter at all if it weren’t for the fact that he then died subsequently at least around that time. If we take his entry into Jerusalem on Nisan 10 to be significant, we must be assuming that he died right around that time, which means that that one entails the other. The question we can ask, however, is how much additional evidence it provides that Jesus also entered Jerusalem on Nisan 10. Another factor for us to consider is that Passover is a particularly likely time for a Jew to enter Jerusalem and also a time when he could count on ministering to a large crowd of people who had made their pilgrimage to Judea for the feast. Even with a Bayes Factor of 2 (meaning that it is twice as likely on the hypothesis than on its falsehood), however, the overall cumulative Bayes factor doubles.

But in the real world 'god' appears absolutely uninterested in us.  That is going to justify unbelievers to remain unbelievers, even if you can find 10 ancient authors to corroborate Jesus dying on Nisan 10.

Another example is the fact that Jesus was born in Bethlehem, fulfilling the Old Testament prophecy of Micah 5:2. I realize that this proposition is controversial. However, I will not argue the case (which I think can be made strongly) for Jesus being born in Bethlehem in this article. Here, I only intend to show how in principle such evidences can be relevant to the prior probability of Jesus’ resurrection. To be conservative, I will assign a Bayes factor for Jesus’ birth in Bethlehem to 1000. This is a generous Bayes factor, since clearly much, much less than 1 out of every 1000 individuals that have been born since the time of Micah has been born in Bethlehem, and the probability of Jesus in fact being born in Bethlehem, on the hypothesis that He is indeed the Messiah (based on the prophecy of Micah 5:2), is very high (approaching 1).

You are correct to say it is controversial.  Jesus never became a ruler, whic means you run back to your ad hoc fallacies, deny the plain meaning of "ruler in Israel", and assign it a mystical or "secondary" meaning to avoid admitting that Jesus didn't fulfill Micah 5:2.

Another example is the fact that Christianity became the dominant international religion that it became.

Which would never have happened without Constantine making Christianity the official Roman Empire religion, and in the process criminalizing the pagan religions. 

The Old Testament predicted that the Messiah would be the light to the gentiles, that God’s salvation might reach to the ends of the world (Isaiah 42:6; 49:6). Jesus Himself, during His ministry, said, “And this gospel of the kingdom will be proclaimed throughout the whole world as a testimony to all nations, and then the end will come,” (Mt 24:14).

I take that to be Matthew putting phrases in Jesus' mouth which Jesus never said.  That hypothesis does not break any "rule", except perhaps the "rule" of bible inerrancy. 

This entails that it is quite probable that, on the hypothesis that Jesus really is the Messiah, Christianity would bring people of all nations to a recognition of the God of Israel. However, this seems to be really quite improbable on the falsehood of that hypothesis. Until 313 A.D. (when the Edict of Milan, under the Emperor Constantine, guaranteed religious freedom and made Christianity legal), Christians endured intense persecution under multiple Roman Emperors.

Not really.  If the NT is reliable, the Romans would have known that what Christians believe has more to do with the hope of the hopeless and less to do with any serious threat to Rome. 

Under the circumstances, the odds of Christianity prevailing and becoming an international religion seemed vanishingly small, and yet it did.

No it didn't.  No version of Christianity today represents the version Jesus taught in Matthew.  With few exceptions, all of modern Christianity espouses Paul, and for that reason, do not constitute Christianity.

Again, then, we have a significantly top-heavy likelihood ratio where Christianity’s spread across the world is much, much more expected on the hypothesis of its truth than on its falsehood. I suggest that a Bayes Factor of 1000 is reasonable for this one.

All you need to account for Christianity's spread is a death-cult that aggressively seeks proselytes between the 1st and 4th centuries when joining a new cult came with the obvious benefits of humanitarian aid to those in need.

If my assigned estimated Bayes Factors for the above four examples are reasonable, then our cumulative Bayes Factor is already 20,000,000 (meaning, our evidence is 20 million times more likely if Jesus is the Messiah than if He isn’t). There is admittedly a certain degree of subjectivity involved in assigning those Bayes factors, but I have tried to be reasonable and conservative, and I am only attempting to show how the argument may be probabilistically modeled given certain sets of assumptions. Those were only four examples, and there are many more that I could provide. Cumulatively, I would argue, this sort of evidence leads one to think that God may plausibly have motivation for raising Jesus of Nazareth specifically from the dead as God’s vindication of Jesus’ claims, message, and teaching (certainly more so than if He were some obscure miscellaneous Joe Blow). This argument can be developed still further (for more examples, see my earlier article here).

If Jesus' miracles vindicated his message, why are you so slow to conclude that the miracles done in Roman Catholicism vindicate Catholic theology?  Does the bible say that miracles in the latter days will have a different purpose than they had for Jesus?

Another consideration here is that the Old Testament predicts that the Messiah would be raised from the dead (Isa 53:10),

Which view cannot be documented from anything in pre-Christian Judaism.   

and Jesus Himself claimed numerous times that His resurrection from the dead would be God’s vindication of His radical Messianic claims. For example, there is strong historical support for the veracity of Jesus’ statement in John 2:19 that He would “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up” (speaking of His body), though again I will not get into the details of the supporting evidence here.

It doesn't matter if Jesus said it.  his audience thought he was talking about the Temple building (v. 20).  Then the author cuts in and insists that Jesus was speaking about the "temple" of his body (v. 21).  The author is doing what most Christian scholars think John is doing:  he is putting new spins on the words of the historical Christ to make it seem like Jesus spoke in some type of code that only the enlightened few could recognize. 

Since that is itself a prediction that He would be raised from the dead,

No, it is John taking a statement Jesus made about the Temple building and falsely reinterpreting it. 

it may be taken as historical that Jesus really did predict ahead of time not only His impending violent death, but also His resurrection. This and other predictions of Jesus’ resurrection in the gospels can also be historically confirmed to be authentic, but we need not get into the details here.

it wouldn't matter if you did, nothing in the bible can get rid of the sad reality that even for many sincere Christians, god's "hiddenness" of silence is intolerably consistent and leaves them unable to distinguish a dead god from a living god who avoid interacting with his followers.

If Jesus really did predict ahead of time not only His impending violent death but also His resurrection from the dead, this also gives us reason to suspect that God may plausibly have motivation for raising Jesus of Nazareth specifically from the dead.

And it also doesn't matter, since the "god" you are trying to get people to serve, has a very bad real-world track record of giving any appearance that he gives a shit what happens.


Overcoming the Subjectivity of Prior Assignment
One may challenge the appropriateness of a Bayesian approach to miracles on the basis that the assignment of the prior probability of a miraculous event is quite subjective.

That's right.  Christian scholars disagree on the degree to which any resurrection testimony in the NT comes from eyewitnesses.  Alleged eyewitness Matthew's use of Mark is reasonably viewed as reducing the likelihood that Matthew was an eyewitness, even if you can trifle that any eyewitness may possibly find a non-eyewitness's version more preferable to his own.  it isn't like the debate must be concluded as soon as you have invented a possible trifle that keeps your faith from being 100% irrational.  Whether skepticism toward Jesus can be reasonable arises from grounds independent of whether your trust in Jesus can be reasonable.  Again, it is not true that in every disagreement, at least one person has to be unreasonable. 

However, this obstacle can be overcome by back-solving for how low of a prior the pertinent evidence could overcome. For example, in their chapter in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, Tim and Lydia McGrew argue for a Bayes factor of the evidence pertaining to the resurrection of 1044, “a weight of evidence that would be sufficient to overcome a prior probability (or rather improbability) of 10-40 for R and leave us with a posterior probability in excess of 0.9999.” [15]

Will God protect me from going to hell while I check out the McGrew's calculations?  Or should I scrap the effort at better understanding and "get saved" ASAP because I never know when I will die and seal my fate for eternity? 

Likewise, I have similarly argued in a previous article that the cumulative Bayes factor of the evidence for God’s existence, on the most charitable of assumptions, is sufficient to overcome a prior probability of 10-18 and still yield posterior odds of God’s existence of 0.9999.

And again, the real world teaches us that God has no interest in communicating with his sincere followers, and yet you continue fallaciously assuming that if god "exists", all refusal to serve him becomes irrational and unreasonable. Not so.

Thus, one can calculate how small a prior would need to be in order to overcome the positive evidence for a hypothesis. Even if we do not know precisely what the prior is, if we are reasonably confident that the prior is higher than that value, then a more precise estimate of the prior becomes less important.
Conclusion
To conclude, while the dictum that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” may have rhetorical appeal, a closer inspection reveals that it is fraught with oft-overlooked problems.

No, the s tupid version of ECREE as espoused by lazy atheists, is fraught with oft-overlooked problems.  The objective and fair version of ECREE does not have those problems and still shows the reasonableness of those who reject miracle claims where the evidence hasn't passed the highest authentication standards. 

Sagan’s dictum has regrettably often been used to shut down inquiry and discourse rather than foster it and encourage an open-minded and careful investigation of the public evidence bearing on resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.

And you'll never know how many times an atheist saved herself from a life of Mormonism by shutting down an apologetics conversation with a Protestant. 

My hope and prayer is that this article clears the way for more productive dialogue between Christians and skeptics on the epistemology of testimony and the provability of miracles.

That doesn't seem to be sincere.  I robustly challenged you a few years ago, and you signaled your fear of losing any such debate by pretending that because I had sued several people in the past, you were choosing to avoid the debate.  FUCK YOU. 

Jason Engwer doesn't appreciate the strong justification for skepticism found in John 7:5

Bart Ehrman, like thousands of other skeptics, uses Mark 3:21 and John 7:5 to argue that Jesus' virgin birth (VB) is fiction.  Jason Eng...